United Nations S/2010/453

Security Council

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2 September 2010

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Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1921 (2010), by which the Council, following the request of the Government of Nepal and the recommendation of the Secretary-General, renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) until 15 September 2010. UNMIN was established as a special political mission in 2007 with a mandate that includes the monitoring of the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), which is now the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M). This report reviews the progress of the peace process and the implementation of the mandate of UNMIN since my last report to the Security Council, of 28 April 2010 (S/2010/214).

II. Progress of the peace process

2. During the reporting period there has been no substantive progress on the main outstanding tasks of the peace process, namely resolving the future of the two armies and completing the drafting of the constitution. The parties were preoccupied by their intense political differences related to the extension of the term of the Constituent Assembly and the election of a new Prime Minister, both of which became linked to the issue of the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel. A constitutional crisis over the expiry of the term of the Constituent Assembly was averted when UCPN-M, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (UML), and the Nepali Congress concluded a three-point agreement by which they committed themselves to move forward by consensus to complete the remaining tasks of the peace process; to extend the Constituent Assembly's tenure by one year; and to pave the way for a consensus government through the resignation of the Prime Minister.

3. The Prime Minister, Madhav Kumar Nepal, submitted his resignation on 30 June in a televised address. As the deadline set by the President for inter-party negotiations to form a consensus government passed without an agreement, Parliament was convened to elect a Prime Minister by an absolute majority vote. The voting started on 21 July, but after five rounds neither of the two remaining nominees, Ram Chandra Poudel of the Nepali Congress and Pushpa Kamal Dahal

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"Prachanda" of UCPN-M, had secured a majority. Each candidate needs the support of other parties, but those with significant vote blocs have remained neutral. UML has resolved only to support a candidate who can command a two-thirds majority. The Madheshi parties reunited on 16 July to revive the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) and again became the fourth largest political force in the Constituent Assembly. UDMF requested the contesting parties to make clear their positions on several Madheshi issues but has remained neutral in the voting.

4. The Supreme Court ruled late in July that the matter of whether recruitment by the Nepal Army violated the peace agreements was not within its jurisdiction, but fell under the purview of the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee. This verdict was interpreted by the Nepal Army as allowing it to begin fresh recruitment, on the basis that it invalidated a stay order against recruitment issued by the same court. The Nepal Army advertised 3,464 positions, which was followed by a Maoist army statement that it, too, would begin to recruit. UNMIN wrote to both the Government and UCPN-M and reiterated publicly its consistent position that any recruitment by either army constitutes a breach of the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies.

5. The Nepal Army spokesperson has stated that the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, the designated forum for addressing matters pertaining to the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, is now "irrelevant" following the formation of the Legislature Parliament, and that the Army should no longer remain under UNMIN monitoring. The Chief of Army Staff was reported as saying that the UNMIN mandate should not be extended.

6. UNMIN has continued its consultations with representatives of the major political parties regarding possible arrangements for its withdrawal and the transfer of its residual monitoring responsibilities. However, those representatives have maintained the view that this would be premature in the current political climate. The persistent efforts of UNMIN in this regard, in accordance with Security Council resolutions, included a "non-paper" intended to encourage discussions and forward thinking on the technical details of the integration and rehabilitation process, subject to essential political decisions being taken by the parties on the numbers and modalities for integration. The "non-paper", which was made available in June to a limited number of party interlocutors, placed technical activities against a timeline and showed that an estimated 39 weeks could be needed to organize the orderly discharge of Maoist army personnel, including time needed to equip the Government's implementing institutions; to brief, register and profile personnel inside the cantonments, and physically regroup them; to plan the integration and rehabilitation in greater detail and to organize the logistics, staffing, coordination and funding aspects of this major exercise. The "non-paper" was leaked to the media and given a distorted interpretation, for which UNMIN was then criticized for allegedly exceeding its mandate.

A. Drafting of the Constitution

7. Since my last report, and following the extension of its term on 28 May, the Constituent Assembly amended its schedule of work for the eleventh time and identified 13 April 2011 as the date for the promulgation of the new constitution. According to the schedule, the Constitutional Committee will prepare the first draft

of the constitution by mid-November 2010. The timeline for the remaining steps of the process is to be determined by the Business Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly.

8. The decision to establish a State Restructuring Commission remains suspended, owing to the ongoing standoff on government formation, despite agreement among the three major parties that it would start work by 31 July and report within two months to the Constitutional Committee on the names, numbers and boundaries of proposed federal units. UDMF and the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities oppose the Commission on the grounds that decisions on the formation of federal units fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Restructuring the State and Distribution of State Power, which has already proposed 14 federal units based on ethnic identity. Seventeen small political parties represented in the Constituent Assembly have also opposed the Commission, saying that they were not consulted on its formation.

B. Integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel

9. The Special Committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate Maoist army personnel has not achieved a quorum in its meetings during the reporting period because of the non-attendance of some members, principally UCPN-M, which has not participated for several months. No agreement has been reached on previous proposals, including the 112-day action plan submitted by the Prime Minister in January and the establishment of a supervisory mechanism and code of conduct for the Maoist army, first proposed by the Technical Committee in September 2009. Discussions on integration and rehabilitation have been held bilaterally between the political parties, the three major parties each tabling a separate proposal. The positions broadly converge on bringing Maoist army personnel under the supervision of the Special Committee as a first step, and on their separation into groups according to their future preference for political work, for integration into the security forces, and for "rehabilitation", including vocational training, education and employment. Serious disagreements persist on key issues such as the number of Maoist personnel to be integrated into the Nepal Army and other security forces, their eligibility criteria, whether they integrate individually or in groups, and the sequencing and time frame for the implementation process.

10. The Technical Committee, whose tenure has been extended to mid-September, has engaged in consultations with the international community on technical preparations for possible support to the discharge, rehabilitation and integration of the 19,602 Maoist army personnel. UNMIN and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), together with the donor community, made a joint presentation to the Technical Committee, outlining lessons learned from the discharge from the Maoist army earlier in 2010 of minors and late recruits, as well as from international discharge and rehabilitation processes. UNMIN continues to meet regularly with the Technical Committee and to convene coordination meetings at which donors and international organizations share information related to integration and rehabilitation. At these and other forums, the Mission has urged that greater attention be paid to the technical planning of this process.

C. Other challenges facing the peace process

11. No major incidents were reported during the rally called on 1 May by UCPN-M to unseat the Government, but tensions were high and sporadic clashes were observed in several districts during the six subsequent days of the strike. The Nepal Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimated that more than 200 people were injured as a result of the activities of UCPN-M or the police or in clashes between parties. According to OHCHR, the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force were deployed in numbers commensurate with those of the protestors and operated in a professional manner to prevent an escalation of violence. A number of counter-protests calling for an end to the strikes were held across the country, including a large "peace rally" organized by the Federation of Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Industries and civil society groups in Kathmandu a day before the strike was called off.

12. Insecurity and reports of lawlessness persist, predominantly in the Tarai and the eastern hills, including violent clashes between political party-affiliated organizations, especially their youth wings. OHCHR has documented 24 such incidents since early May. Numerous injuries, and two deaths, have been reported, including the stabbing on 8 July of a UML leader in Okhaldhunga district in eastern Nepal, reportedly by UCPN-M cadres. Intense competition for control of local power structures and resources, struggle over political space, differences in ideology and the escalation of personal quarrels have been the primary impetus for the clashes. Moreover, during the reporting period, OHCHR received reports of three cases of alleged extrajudicial executions by the security forces, taking the total number of reported incidents of this type since January 2009 to 24.

13. Extortion by armed groups and ethnic-based organizations has increased, largely targeting local government officials, teachers and businessmen, particularly in the eastern hill districts. Despite increased police patrolling and their own disorganized structures, these organizations maintain the capacity for large-scale extortion, aided by the remoteness and hilly terrain of the areas where they operate. As a result of threats, secretaries of Village Development Committees, the highest State authority at this level, tendered their resignation en masse between 18 June and 28 July, rendering governmental services unavailable to rural populations in 14 districts across the country. In response, the Government decided on 30 July to deploy security personnel and intensify joint patrolling by the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force at Village Development Committee offices and the secretaries' residences.

III. Activities of the United Nations Mission in Nepal

A. Arms monitoring

14. The Arms Monitoring Office continued to monitor the compliance of the Nepal Army and the Maoist army with the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, maintaining round-the-clock surveillance of the Nepal Army weapons storage site and the weapons storage areas at the seven main cantonment sites of the Maoist army. Arms monitors also visited the satellite cantonment sites on a regular basis and conducted other operations using mobile

teams. At the request of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, arms monitors observed salary payments to Maoist army personnel for the period from mid-May to mid-July.

15. During the reporting period, the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee met five times and considered six alleged violations, of which one was substantiated, two dismissed and three remain under investigation.

B. Child protection

16. The Child Protection Unit continued to provide advisory support to OHCHR, UNICEF and UNDP in the implementation of rehabilitation programmes for former Maoist army personnel disqualified as minors, as well as to the United Nations mechanism for monitoring compliance with the discharge action plan.

C. Political affairs

17. The Political Affairs Office continued to monitor, analyse and report on the implications of the overall political situation for the peace process and to assist Mission leadership in supporting the peace process. Political affairs officers have maintained regular contacts with a broad range of Government officials, political party representatives, civil society organizations and international actors. The activities of groups opposed to the peace process, their potential to disrupt progress, the dynamics among the political parties, and the role of traditionally marginalized groups were monitored. The Office followed the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly and the work of its committees in preparing the new constitution.

D. Public information

18. The Public Information and Translation Unit continued to monitor and engage with the media, disseminating products related to the work of the Mission and setting the record straight on a range of issues.

E. Safety and security

19. The security situation in Kathmandu has been generally calm and stable during the reporting period, notwithstanding clashes during the general strike called by UCPN-M early in May. Three separate low-intensity improvised explosive devices were detonated outside the International Convention Centre, which houses UNMIN and the Constituent Assembly, but caused no injuries or damage to property. Five civilians were injured, however, by an improvised explosive device placed outside a nursing home in Kathmandu. There were no direct threats made against Mission staff or property during the reporting period but an effigy of my Representative in Nepal was burnt in Birgunj in the Central region on 19 July by a little-known group, reportedly in reaction to the leaked "non-paper" on the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel.

F. Mission support

20. The mission support component, operating under the constraints of a short mandate, has continued to provide logistics, security and medical services for UNMIN activities throughout the Mission area, priority being given to the cantonment sites. As at 24 August 2010, 248 of the authorized 278 personnel were serving in the Mission. Of 183 civilian personnel, 35.3 per cent were women. Of the 51 substantive staff, 35.2 per cent are women, while 26.5 per cent of 132 administrative staff are women. Currently, 3 of the 72 arms monitors serving with the Mission are women. Gender representation in this area is dependent on the nomination of candidates by Member States. As a result of UNMIN efforts to recruit national staff from traditionally marginalized groups, 39.2 per cent of the 123 national staff are from traditionally marginalized groups, and 37.5 per cent are women.

IV. Human rights

21. In June, the Government and OHCHR agreed to renew the OHCHR country office agreement for one year, and the phased closure of all offices outside Kathmandu. OHCHR agreed to continue its cooperation with the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal and build the capacity of civil society organizations. The High Commissioner received assurances from the Government that OHCHR will continue to exercise its mandate independently to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Nepal, to have full access to places of detention and to interview detainees in private, to have access to all sectors of government and to obtain official documentation as required.

22. Despite repeated commitments on the part of both the Government and UCPN-M there has been no quantifiable progress in holding to account perpetrators of human rights violations. The Nepal Army continues to disregard a warrant for the arrest of the officer accused in the torture and killing of a 15-year-old, Maina Sunuwar, in 2004, and has reportedly exonerated him in a Court of Inquiry it established to probe the circumstances of his repatriation from the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad in 2009. For its part, the UCPN-M leadership has continued its non-cooperation with criminal investigations into the alleged crimes of its cadres both during and since the conflict, including the killing of 36 civilians in the bombing of a public bus in Chitwan district in 2005 and the other killings.

23. The United Nations monitoring mechanism continued its work of monitoring adherence by UCPN-M to commitments made in the action plan, signed in December 2009 with the Government, for the formal discharge of Maoist army personnel disqualified during the verification process in 2007 as minors and late recruits. The mechanism is led by OHCHR and UNICEF, with advisory support from the UNMIN Child Protection Unit. Concerns were raised over the safety of a United Nations-registered former child soldier who addressed the Security Council about her experience. Her real name was made public by media in Nepal and she was reportedly threatened by Maoist army personnel. The mechanism confirmed no further harassment.

V. United Nations country team coordination

24. The economic situation continues to be adversely affected by the political stalemate. Pending the formation of a new government, the Finance Minister presented a special financial bill in lieu of a budget in July. This emergency procedure, used also in 2009/10, provides the Government with automatic access to one third of the prior year's budget as a bridging arrangement, but creates challenges for the Executive. The outgoing Government substantially advanced the preparation of the next three-year plan (2010/13) around the core theme of "Employment-centric inclusive development".

25. With the support of the United Nations country team, the Government produced its latest Millennium Development Goal progress report, recording, despite the political uncertainties, significant progress in most of the Goals, in particular on gender equality, child health, maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Goals which Nepal will struggle to reach on the basis of current trends include eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, and ensuring environmental sustainability. Of particular concern is whether further progress in the countdown to 2015 will be shared more evenly across Nepal's 75 districts, ethnic communities and castes and between women and men, in order to ensure the kind of development that will bolster peace. In order to improve the effectiveness of their support to the peace process, development partners continued work on a comprehensive peace and development strategy to be completed by September, prepared jointly with international financial institutions and bilateral donors in consultation with the Government and local partners. Facilitated by the United Nations Resident Coordinator in coordination with UNMIN and the country team, the strategy identified priorities for development support addressing both short-term and longer-term elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

26. The inter-agency rehabilitation programme for the 4,008 disqualified personnel verified as minors and late recruits and discharged from the Maoist army earlier in 2010 continued to receive new applicants throughout the reporting period. The programme, managed by UNICEF, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund and the International Labour Organization, provides counselling, community support and access to rehabilitation packages. To date, 2,000 of those discharged (50 per cent of the eligible total) have made contact with the programme and 800 are currently taking courses. The first batch of 194 graduates is now being assisted to find employment.

27. Humanitarian needs and acute vulnerability remain of serious concern in Nepal, in particular with hunger and malnutrition emerging as a silent crisis. With inflation rates at around 14 per cent in 2010, food prices have surpassed those at the height of the international food crisis of 2008, placing those already vulnerable to food insecurity at an even greater risk. The World Food Programme has been able to raise $73 million (95 per cent for their part of the humanitarian appeal request) from other sources, including a $36 million commitment from the Government of Nepal with World Bank funding. All funds are going towards activities focused on a range of short- and medium-term food security and agriculture-related interventions providing assistance to around 2.2 million people in Nepal. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has assisted around 103,111 households in 10 food insecure districts to meet their planting needs for the summer cropping season. At the end of 2009, the Central Emergency Response Fund had

allocated $6 million to support food aid activities and an additional allocation is planned in 2010 through the Fund window for underfunded emergencies to further assist humanitarian activities in the country.

VI. Observations

28. Nepal's peace process remains stalled, with few signs of a consensual way forward. The major parties are preoccupied by profound internal fissures and the question of power-sharing. While the extension of the Constituent Assembly by one year averted a grave political vacuum, over three months have passed without notable headway in the peace process.

29. UNMIN has continued to pursue the request of the Security Council to work with the parties to make arrangements for its departure. Interlocutors from all major parties have underlined, however, that they see no alternative to UNMIN monitoring at present. To help speed the creation of conditions that would enable the Mission to conclude its tasks, UNMIN has consistently and assiduously urged the parties to agree on measures that could be taken in the short term, and has made proposals to that end, ranging from steps to improve monitoring arrangements to strengthening preparedness for integration and rehabilitation. A non-paper prepared by UNMIN to stimulate discussion was leaked to the press, and its purpose misconstrued, leading to strong criticism of UNMIN for having exceeded its mandate, including, regrettably, from the highest levels of government.

30. Despite the sustained efforts of the United Nations Mission in Nepal, little progress has been made towards the conditions for its departure, as the continuing political stalemate has precluded the necessary cooperation among the parties. Six extensions of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal have taken place on the unfulfilled expectation, and the commitment of the Government, that the remaining key tasks of the peace process would be brought to a close. Those commitments have become unrealistic in the absence of a consensual approach. Following the resignation of the Prime Minister, Madhav Kumar Nepal, at the end of June, I encouraged the parties to intensify efforts towards the formation of a consensus government, and at the time of writing this remains my hope.

31. It should be recalled that the original intention in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was to address contentious issues through a consensus government comprising the two parties to the peace process. The Agreement was founded on parallel commitments, including the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army, to be resolved through the Special Committee, and an action plan established by the Council of Ministers for the democratization of the Nepal Army, determining its appropriate size, developing its national and inclusive character, and training it in the norms and values of democracy and human rights. UNMIN has repeatedly pressed for action on both points, before and after the Constituent Assembly elections, and has long warned of serious implications for the hard-won gains of the peace process if the future of the two armies were not addressed promptly.

32. It is the view of many that UNMIN contributes to maintaining continued calm and avoiding escalation through its presence and a successful arms monitoring and dispute resolution regime. On the other hand, its seemingly indefinite presence may be taken for granted, and the Mission is repeatedly made a scapegoat for matters

which lie beyond its mandate. As I have stated before, the United Nations interest is to see UNMIN complete its mandated tasks and bring closure to its work in Nepal.

33. Since January 2010, the Council has acceded to two requests for four-month extensions of the Mission. I am not in favour of repeated extensions of the Mission's mandate in an atmosphere of persistent and unfounded criticism that complicates its ability to function. These short extensions carry significant management difficulties for the Mission, while having had no discernible effect in expediting the political decisions required for the Mission to complete its work.

34. The present situation whereby Nepal is governed by a caretaker government and the main focus of the political parties is on government formation has not been conducive to sustained engagement over the future role of the Mission. Under these circumstances, I recommend that the current mandate of UNMIN be rolled over by the Council in order to permit the necessary discussions to take place with a duly formed government.

35. Should these discussions offer neither clarity over the role of the Mission nor any prospect of consensus among the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies regarding a realistic and time-bound fulfilment of their commitments concerning the armies and the phasing-out of UNMIN monitoring, then I will propose alternative measures to the Council, including the possible termination of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal.

36. I do not underestimate the challenge for the parties to implement the fundamental changes agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It is my firm view, however, that at this critical juncture of the peace process this challenge should be met through a consensual and negotiated process. To this end, I call on the parties to invest greater effort in serious and sustained political dialogue. The choice between continued inertia and a fresh momentum is in the hands of the national leadership. With the passage of time and the current political context adding to the risks inherent in breaches of past agreements, all parties should make scrupulous efforts to respect those agreements, with particular emphasis on commitments pertaining to the armed personnel of the Government and the Maoists.

37. I would like to convey my appreciation to the members of the Security Council and other Member States for their continued support to Nepal and to the work of the United Nations in support of Nepal's peace process. I would also like to thank my Representative, Karin Landgren, and her staff, as well as partner organizations in Nepal, for their dedicated efforts.

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Security Council

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27 August 2010

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Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008) and 1884 (2009) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 20 July 2010 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 11 August 2010 (S/2010/430) recommending this extension,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006),

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), in particular the latest grave violation of 3 August 2010 highlighted in the Secretary-General's letter of 11 August 2010 and *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigation with a view to preventing such incidents in the future,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701,

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety and encouraging the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL, notably of its Commander, and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

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Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and stressing the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Calling upon member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2011;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, welcomes the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces and calls on further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* the deployment of an additional brigade of the Lebanese armed forces on 1 August 2010 and *calls* on the Government of Lebanon to further increase the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed in Southern Lebanon, consistent with resolution 1701 (2006);

4. *Strongly calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

5. *Deplores* strongly the recent incidents involving UNIFIL peacekeepers, *emphasizes* the importance of not impairing the ability of UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and *calls on* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement;

6. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and emphasizes that more work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

7. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

8. *Reaffirms* its call for the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

9. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

11. *Welcomes* the conclusions of the Joint DPKO-UNIFIL Technical Review presented in the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 12 February 2010 (S/2010/86) and *calls* for their rapid implementation;

12. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda items 16, 49 and 67

Question of Palestine

Culture of peace

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Letter dated 26 August 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Tajikistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour, in my capacity as Chair of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Group in New York, to draw your attention to the continued desecration and destruction by Israel of the historic Muslim Ma'man Allah (Mamilla) Cemetery in Jerusalem and to the attempt by the Israeli authorities to clear these hallowed grounds for the construction of a so-called "Centre for Human Dignity and Museum of Tolerance" as well as the construction of a "judicial complex" on another part of the Cemetery. The building of such institutions of "tolerance" and "justice" via the disinterment of human remains and the destruction of hundreds and hundreds of graves should be offensive to any individual with moral conscience and basic human sensitivity.

The Mamilla Cemetery is an ancient Muslim burial ground and holy site dating back at least to the twelfth century, where thousands of Palestinian families, religious figures and officials, scholars and martyrs have been laid to rest. For decades, this Cemetery has been recognized as a historic site, central to the Islamic religious sites and heritage in the City of Jerusalem, declared a historic site by the Muslim Supreme Council in 1927 and an antiquities site by the British Mandate authorities in 1944. For hundreds of years the Waqf (Islamic Endowment) of Jerusalem had cared for the Cemetery, but . as been prevented by Israel from accessing the Cemetery grounds since 1967, causing it to fall into disrepair. Even families of the deceased who have attempted over the years to repair and clean gravesites have faced obstructions, with repairs destroyed or removed by the Israeli authorities, ensuring that the Cemetery remains in constant disrepair.

Regrettably, in grave disrespect of the universal norms regarding burial sites, which are to be protected and preserved, in grave disrespect of the sensitivities and

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rights of the descendants of those buried in the Mamilla Cemetery, and in a display of disregard of Islamic religious and Palestinian cultural sensitivities, the Israeli authorities have carried out yet another wave of destruction in the Cemetery. Following the desecration and bulldozing of 1,500 graves in 2009, this month at least 150 recently restored tombs and grave markers as well as several older tombs in the Cemetery have been destroyed, disinterring more human remains. This condemnable act of destruction was carried out despite the fact that the Israeli court-appointed custodian of the Cemetery, Hajj Mustafa Abu Zahra, was permitted during the past few months to undertake minor maintenance and renovations in the Cemetery. Moreover, excessive force was used against those protesting this latest desecration of the Cemetery, including against Hajj Abu Zahra, who, with other Jerusalemites, tried to block the bulldozers.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference has thus been compelled to draw your attention to Israel's disrespect of this historic Islamic burial ground as well of other religious and cultural heritage sites in the City of Jerusalem. In this regard, it must be pointed out that several impartial reports have addressed the vulnerability of religious and historic sites in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in Israel. This includes the 2009 International Religious Freedom Report of the United States State Department, which noted that the Government of Israel "implements regulations only for Jewish sites. Non-Jewish holy sites do not enjoy legal protection ...", and that "while well-known sites have de facto protection as a result of their international importance, many Muslim and Christian sites are neglected, inaccessible or threatened by property developers and municipalities".

Such actions, including the desecration of the Mamilla Cemetery, must be firmly condemned. Urgent efforts must be undertaken to preserve and protect the Mamilla Cemetery, a site of importance to the Palestinian, Arab and Muslim heritage. In this regard, Israel, the occupying Power, must be called upon by the international community to cease all such illegal, deplorable and provocative actions, which constitute yet further attempts by Israel to erase the Palestinian Arab identity, history and presence in the land and, particularly, in the Holy City of Jerusalem and which risk further inflaming religious sensitivities and destabilizing the very fragile situation on the ground.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 16, 49 and 67, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sirodjidin **Aslov**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2010/456

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 27 August 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication dated 27 August 2010 (see annex), which I have received from the Registrar of the International Criminal Court, Ms. Silvana Arbia, transmitting a copy of two decisions issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber I on 27 August 2010, the decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya and the decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's recent visit to the Republic of Chad.

I should be most grateful if you would bring the present letter and its attachments to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Note verbale dated 27 August 2010 from the Registrar of the International Criminal Court addressed to the Secretary-General

The Registrar of the International Criminal Court presents her compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit for onward transmission to the Security Council the decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya (ICC-02/05-01/09-107) as well as the decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's presence in the territory of the Republic of Chad (ICC-02/05-01/09-109) rendered today by Pre-Trial Chamber I.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Giovanni Bassu, Special Adviser on External Relations and Cooperation, by e-mail at giovanni.bassu@icc-cpi.int or by telephone at +31 70 515 8631, or Ms. Anne-Aurore Bertrand, Acting External Relations Officer, by e-mail at anneaurore.bertrand@icc-cpi.int or by telephone at +31 70 515 8202.

Enclosure 1

ICC-02/05-01/09-107 27-08-2010 1/4 RH PT

Cour
Pénale
Internationale

International
Criminal
Court

Original: English

No.: ICC-02/05-01/09
Date: 27 August 2010

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: Judge Cuno Tarfusser, Presiding Judge
Judge Sylvia Steiner
Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng

SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN

THE PROSECUTOR V. OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR

Public Document

Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya

Document to be notified, in accordance with regulation 31 of the *Regulations of the Court*, to:

The Office of the Prosecutor
Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo

Counsel for the Defence

Legal Representatives of Victims

Legal Representatives of Applicants

Unrepresented Victims

Unrepresented Applicants for Participation/Reparation

The Office of Public Counsel for Victims

The Office of Public Counsel for the Defence

States Representatives

Amicus Curiae

REGISTRY

Registrar
Ms Silvana Arbia

Deputy Registrar
Mr Didier Preira

Victims and Witnesses Unit

Detention Section

Victims Participation and Reparations Section

Others

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I of the International Criminal Court (the "Chamber" and the "Court", respectively);

NOTING that, according to public information available to the Chamber,[1] Omar Al-Bashir, as President of Sudan, has been invited by the Government of Kenya to attend the celebrations for the promulgation of the new Kenyan Constitution scheduled to take place in Kenya on 27 August 2010;

NOTING the warrants of arrest against Omar Al-Bashir issued by the Chamber respectively on 4 March 2009 and 12 July 2010 which are yet to be executed;[2]

NOTING that the Republic of Kenya has a clear obligation to cooperate with the Court in relation to the enforcement of such warrants of arrest, which stems both from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593(2005)[3], whereby the United Nations Security Council "urge[d] all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully" with the Court, and from article 87 of the Statute of the Court, to which the Republic of Kenya is a State Party;

CONSIDERING it appropriate to inform the Security Council of the United Nations as well as the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about the expected attendance of Omar Al-Bashir at the celebration scheduled for Friday 27 August in order for them to take any action they may deem appropriate, should such attendance be confirmed;

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[1] http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/27/97001-20100827FIL.WWW00307-le-president-soudanais-a-nairobi.php; http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article36085; http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/HRW/deb99149cd9ac034a2c0fbc74bda1a3b.htm.

[2] ICC-02/05-01/09-1 ICC-02/05-01/09-95.

[3] S/RES/1593 (2005)

FOR THESE REASONS

INFORMS the Security Council of the United Nations and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's presence on the territory of the Republic Kenya, in order for them to take any measure they may deem appropriate;

ORDERS the Registrar to immediately transmit the present decision to the Security Council, through the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to the Assembly of the State Parties to the Court.

Done in both English and French, the English version being authoritative.

Dated this Friday, 27 August 2010

At The Hague, The Netherlands

Judge Cuno Tarfusser
Presiding Judge

Judge Sylvia Steiner

Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng

Cour Pénale Internationale
International Criminal Court

Name: Vera Bi Wang
Certified document
No. ICC-02/05-01/09-107
Title: Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute
4/4 dated 27 August 2010
27 August 2010
The Hague

No. ICC-02/05-01/09

Enclosure 2

ICC-02/05-01/09-109 27-08-2010 1/4 RH PT

Cour
Pénale
Internationale

International
Criminal
Court

Original: English

No.: ICC-02/05-01/09
Date: 27 August 2010

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: Judge Cuno Tarfusser, Presiding Judge
Judge Sylvia Steiner
Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng

SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN

THE PROSECUTOR V. OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL B IR

Public Document

Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's recent visit to the Republic of Chad

Document to be notified, in accordance with regulation 31 of the *Regulations of the Court*, to:

The Office of the Prosecutor Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo	**Counsel for the Defence**
Legal Representatives of Victims	**Legal Representatives of Applicants**
Unrepresented Victims	**Unrepresented Applicants for Participation/Reparation**
The Office of Public Counsel for Victims	**The Office of Public Counsel for the Defence**
States Representatives	**Amicus Curiae**

REGISTRY

Registrar Ms Silvana Arbia	**Deputy Registrar** Mr Didier Preira
Victims and Witnesses Unit	**Detention Section**
Victims Participation and Reparations Section	**Others**

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I of the International Criminal Court (the "Chamber" and the "Court", respectively);

NOTING the "Registry's report on the recent visits of Omar Al Bashir to the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Kenya",[1] filed on 27 August 2010, whereby the Registrar, *inter alia*, informed the Chamber that, according to the information available, Omar Al Bashir had gone to N'Djamena in order to attend the summit of the Sahel-Saharan States on 21 July 2010, allegedly leaving Chad on 23 July 2010;

NOTING the warrants of arrest against Omar Al-Bashir issued by the Chamber respectively on 4 March 2009 and 12 July 2010 which are yet to be executed;[2]

NOTING that the Republic of Chad has an obligation to cooperate with the Court in relation to the enforcement of such warrants of arrest, which stems both from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593(2005)[3], whereby the United Nations Security Council "urge[d] all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully" with the Court, and from article 87 of the Statute of the Court, to which the Republic of Chad is a State Party;

CONSIDERING it appropriate to inform the Security Council of the United Nations as well as the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about the recent visit of Omar Al-Bashir to the Republic of Chad, in order for them to take any action they may deem appropriate;

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[1] ICC-02/05-01/09-108-Conf
[2] ICC-02/05-01/09-1 ICC-02/05-01/09-95.
[3] S/RES/1593 (2005).

FOR THESE REASONS

INFORMS the Security Council of the United Nations and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's visit in the Republic of Chad allegedly between 21 and 23 July 2010, in order for them to take any measure they may deem appropriate;

ORDERS the Registrar to transmit the present decision to the Security Council, through the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute.

Done in both English and French, the English version being authoritative.

Dated this Friday, 27 August 2010

At The Hague, The Netherlands

Judge Cuno Tarfusser
Presiding Judge

Judge Sylvia Steiner

Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng

Cour Pénale Internationale
International Criminal Court

Name: SCHRUDER Natacha
Certified document
No ICC-02/05-01/09-109
Title Decision informing the UN Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's recent visit to the Republic of Chad
The Hague, 27/08/2010 at 7.20 PM

United Nations S/2010/457

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 August 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 30 August 2010 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 11 December 2009 (S/2009/697) concerning your intention to establish a United Nations regional office for Central Africa in Libreville has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

They take note of the information contained in your letter and welcome the intention expressed therein. They believe that it would be appropriate for the proposed office to be established for an initial period of two years, with a review of its mandate after 18 months. They would welcome regular information from you about the activities of the office, once established, and its impact on the ground. They would welcome receiving an initial report six months after the office becomes fully operational.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**
President of the Security Council

10-49996 (E) 310810

Please recycle

United Nations S/2010/458

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 31 August 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to the latest decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court of 27 August 2010 informing the Security Council about the visits of His Excellency Mr. Omer Hassan Al-Bashir, President of the Republic of the Sudan, to the Republic of Chad and Republic of Kenya, and the statements attributed to some members of the Security Council on the same subject, please find attached the press communiqué issued by the African Union condemning the latest move by the International Criminal Court (see annex).

The communiqué reflected the deep concern expressed by the African Union Commission about the decisions of the International Criminal Court, highlighted the obligations of the African Union Member States arising from the constitutive act of the African Union, recalled the repeated appeals of the African Union to the Security Council to defer the proceedings of the International Criminal Court concerning the Sudan, which are being totally ignored by the Security Council, denounced the attempts of the International Criminal Court to involve the Security Council in pressuring the African Union Member States to support the International Criminal Court, irrespective of the complex dynamics on the ground which require balance between peace and justice, and clearly stated the opposition of the African Union to any attempt to coerce African countries to undermine the common African position in this regard.

I would highly appreciate if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative

10-50109 (E) 020910

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 31 August 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Press release on the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court informing the Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about the presence of President Omer Hassan Al-Bashir of the Sudan in the territories of the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Kenya

The African Union Commission had noted with grave concern statements attributed to some members of the Security Council, as well as the decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC-02/05-01/09) of 27 August 2010 of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court informing the Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omer Al-Bashir's presence in the territories of the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Kenya.

The said statements and the decisions assert that the two African Union Member States have "a clear obligation to cooperate with the Court in relation to the enforcement of such warrants of arrest, which stems both from the United Nations Security Council resolution 1593 (2005) whereby the United Nations Security Council 'urge[d] all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully' with the Court, and from article 87 of the Statute of the Court", to which the two countries are States Parties. The African Union Commission further notes that the decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber I were made strangely in respect of the "expected attendance of Omer Al-Bashir at the celebration scheduled for Friday, 27 August 2010".

The African Union Commission expresses its deep regret that both the statements and the decisions grossly ignore and make no reference whatsoever to the obligations of the two countries to the African Union arising from decisions Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) adopted by the thirteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, wherein the Assembly "Decide[d] that in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been acted upon (by the United Nations Security Council), the African Union Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court relating to immunities for the arrest and surrender of President Omer Al-Bashir of the Sudan", which decision was reiterated (decision Assembly/AU/Dec.296(XV) at the fifteenth ordinary session of the Assembly in July 2010 in Kampala, Uganda. Additionally, the statements and the decisions did not take cognizance whatsoever if the obligations of African Union Member States arising from article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which obligates all States Members of the African Union "to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union". Thus, the decisions adopted by the policy organs of the African Union are binding on Chad and Kenya and it would be wrong to coerce them to violate or disregard their obligations to the African Union.

It is to be recalled that the repeated appeals to the United Nations Security Council by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union as well as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to defer the proceedings against President Omer Hassan Al-Bashir of the Sudan for one year in

application of the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute have never been acted upon by the United Nations Security Council. The same United Nations Security Council, which has ignored this request by the States Members of the African Union and which includes States that have no obligations to the International Criminal Court, has no moral authority to sit in judgement over Chad and Kenya. Indeed, by virtue of their membership of the African Union, these two countries have committed themselves to "condemnation and rejection of impunity" and voluntarily negotiated the Rome Statute along with the Organization of African Unity and joined the International Criminal Court with a view to enhancing the fight against impunity.

The African Union Commission recalls that both Chad and Kenya, being neighbours of the Sudan, have an abiding interest in ensuring peace and stability in the Sudan and in promoting peace, justice and reconciliation in that country, which can only be achieved through continuous engagement with the elected Government of that country. Neighbouring countries do this as a matter of survival as they bear the brunt of instability or insecurity in neighbouring States. Kenya, as a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and a guarantor to the peace process in the Sudan, arising from the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement and the impending referendum in South Sudan, has a duty and obligation to continuously engage with President Omer Hassan Al-Bashir and President Silva Kiir.

It is to be noted that engagement with the elected leaders of the Sudan is vitally and strategically essential and unavoidable for the countries of the region as well as the entire continent, which by their location are better able to understand and take into account the local realities and dynamics. The attempt to involve the United Nations Security Council in this matter is yet another effort to pressurize African countries to support the International Criminal Court irrespective of the complex dynamics on the ground which require a fine balance between peace and justice and, in this regard, the African Union shall oppose any attempt to coerce African countries to undermine the common African position.

The African Union will continue to fight against impunity as required by the relevant Assembly decisions as well as article 4 of the Constitutive Act and shall oppose the pretensions and double standards that are evident from the statements being made about the two countries. The African Union believes and will continue to pursue in respect of the Sudan the interconnected, mutually interdependent and equally desirable objectives of peace, justice and reconciliation. It also requests all African countries and friends of Africa to reject any draft resolution that may be tabled before the United Nations Security Council on this matter.

Addis Ababa, 29 August 2010

United Nations S/2010/459

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 September 2010

Original: English

Identical letters dated 1 September 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On the eve of the resumption of direct peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, I write to inform you of a very serious incident in the Middle East that threatens the peace and security of our region.

On 31 August 2010, Palestinian terrorists affiliated with the Hamas terrorist organization opened fire on a vehicle travelling on Route 60 near the community of Kiryat Arba. The four civilian passengers — Talya Imes, 45 years old; Yitzhak Imes, 47 years old; Avishai Shindler, 24 years old; and Kochava Even Chaim, 37 years old, who was pregnant — were murdered in the attack. Augmenting this tragedy, those killed were parents of seven children, who are now orphans.

This latest incident is a deadly reminder of the dangerous terrorist threats emanating from the West Bank, as well as from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. These murders reflect Hamas' and other terrorist organizations' aim to kill Israeli civilians and to derail any peace negotiations. The attack further demonstrates the security needs that are required precisely to address this kind of terrorism.

Israel welcomes the Secretary-General's condemnation of this attack and calls upon the international community to denounce these atrocious murders. Furthermore, Israel will exercise its right of self-defence and will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens and to bring to justice the terrorists responsible for this attack, as well as their dispatchers. Finally, I wish to reiterate that Israel will never let terrorism dictate where or how Israelis live, nor alter our commitment to security or our desire for peace.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Meron **Reuben**
Ambassador

10-50314 (E) 030910

Please recycle

United Nations A/64/908–S/2010/460

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
2 September 2010
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 15
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 1 September 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a complaint regarding the spying networks that were set up in Lebanon by the Israeli intelligence services (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-50432 (E) 080910 140910

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 1 September 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The spying networks that were recruited by the Israeli enemy in Lebanon constitute a blatant aggression against Lebanon and a flagrant violation of its sovereignty. Their existence is contrary to international resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), paragraph 5, in which the Council reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders. Those spying networks also threaten national security because they were able to infiltrate civilian and military institutions. They recruited agents to work on behalf of Israeli intelligence and ordered them to commit acts of sabotage. Such actions are contrary to the fundamental rules that govern international relations and the 1948 Armistice Agreement. The Israeli spying networks operating in Lebanon constitute a unilateral military action that is contrary to resolution 1701 (2006), paragraph 1 of which calls for a full cessation of military operations. This action is therefore a blatant violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

The Israeli spying networks also threaten the security of communications in Lebanon by utilizing their agents to paralyse and control the Lebanese landline and cellular communications networks and eavesdrop on Lebanese citizens. Israel's agents in Lebanon provided the spying networks with information on frequencies and passwords to the servers and vital switching stations of mobile telephone companies, as well as detailed reports on the operations of cellular stations. The spying networks also constitute a threat to Lebanese military and national security. Agents belonging to those networks are urged to engage in acts of sabotage, including setting off explosions, assassinate Lebanese figures, commit acts of terrorism and attack Lebanon's infrastructure. Those agents also foment strife and undermine security and stability in Lebanon by recruiting individuals to gather information that can be exploited to create internal strife. The agents of Israel's intelligence agencies also recruited individuals to provoke hatred and resentment against a fraternal country.

The Israeli spying networks also constitute a flagrant violation of Lebanese sovereignty because, on more than one occasion, the agents of Israel's intelligence agencies facilitated the surreptitious entry of Mossad agents into Lebanon by sea in order to retrieve items from dead letter boxes, provide money to agents or for the Mossad agents themselves to carry out assassinations in Lebanese territory.

Israel's long-standing spying operations seek to undermine the institutions of the Lebanese State. They are contrary to international efforts, which began in 1978 with the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in defiance of the will of the Governments that contribute troops to UNIFIL. The efforts of Israel's spying networks to undermine Lebanese national security are aimed at creating a climate of tension in the Middle East and along the international border, as well as threatening international peace and security. The Security Council must therefore take a firm stance in response to Israel's aggression, which has been documented in the reports of the Secretary-General.

The Israeli intelligence agencies recruited more than 100 agents in order to:

1. Plant explosive devices for the purpose of assassinating Lebanese civilians and foreigners residing in Lebanon.

2. Monitor and gather information on the movement of Lebanese figures and civilians with a view to their assassination, and collect information on vital installations and infrastructure with a view to their bombing and destruction.

3. Drop off and retrieve items from dead letter boxes in various areas of Lebanon.

4. Receive, shelter and guide Israeli military personnel dispatched to carry out assassinations in Lebanon.

5. Monitor and gather information on political party members and centres in Lebanon, and plant listening devices.

6. Gather information on buildings in various parts of Lebanon and Lebanese citizens residing therein. Those buildings were subsequently bombed by the Israeli air force when Israel attacked Lebanon in July and August 2006.

7. Survey several areas in Lebanon and Syria, including border crossings, using advanced photographic equipment hidden inside automobiles. The information gathered was transmitted via satellite using sophisticated equipment or by an agent who would travel abroad in order to deliver videotapes to a Mossad officer.

8. Specify the coordinates of a large number of civilian sites using aerial maps provided by the Israeli intelligence agencies to their agents in Lebanon. The information was transmitted as encrypted images by electronic mail.

9. Provide information concerning new civilian buildings, including the thickness of concrete and the number of floors and shelters.

10. Gather information on the regional commanders of the Lebanese internal security forces and the powers of each agency of the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior. The agents also gathered information on and specified the coordinates of Lebanese Army barracks.

11. Gather information on Lebanese Army roadblocks in the south and the composition of army units and their armament. This information was transmitted by electronic mail.

12. Specify the coordinates of a large number of locations, monitor individuals and send encrypted information via the Internet.

13. Survey all regions of Lebanon, including streets, and then send the videotapes to Israel. This was accomplished using advanced, encrypted flash memory drives that contained aerial photographs of all regions of Lebanon, encryption programs and a camera placed inside an automobile.

14. Gather information on Lebanese Army military institutions and centres.

15. Sell and traffic in drugs.

16. Establish telephone lines for Israeli agents in Lebanon for the purpose of contacting the Mossad and rent automobiles on behalf of those agents for use in carrying out their assignments.

17. Deliver letters and funds to Lebanese who collaborated with the Israeli intelligence agencies.

18. Receive and transmit messages by radio.

19. Gather information on some hospitals in Lebanon.

20. Open a restaurant on the road leading to the Masna' border point between Lebanon and Syria, and install a camera in order to monitor persons and vehicles crossing from one country to the other.

21. Gather information on social institutions, banks, bakeries, petrol stations, car rental agencies, buildings, telephone exchanges and other vital installations in Lebanon.

22. Recruit individuals to work on behalf of the Israeli intelligence agencies.

23. Provide the Israeli intelligence agencies with detailed information on the telephone networks of the Lebanese Ministry of Communications and the cellular phone network operated by Alfa (including location of transmission stations and their capacities, frequencies and orientation, the manner in which such stations are linked and the equipment used). Information was also provided regarding certain servers, their passwords and the programs used on those servers; the names, telephone numbers and addresses of employees and subscribers; and plans for network expansion and development. The agents further provided the Israeli intelligence agencies with information on the billing system, the operations support system (the system used to control call routing equipment prior to registration of calls and their entry into the database), base transceiver stations and base station controllers, as well as on means of disabling the network. The Israeli intelligence agencies also instructed their agents to establish a transmission station in the Hazimiyah area to serve as a link between the Jabal al-Baruk station and the stations serving Beirut and its suburbs in order to use it subsequently for eavesdropping.

24. Transport Israeli intelligence agents who arrived in Lebanon by sea to the southern region of Lebanon and other areas with a view to assassinating Lebanese figures.

25. Specify the coordinates of several military and civilian centres, and provide information concerning the movements and specifications of a large number of commercial vessels and private yachts.

26. Specify the coordinates of the residence of His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic, General Michel Sleiman, in Amshit. The information provided also included a detailed description of the road leading to the residence, including intersections, entrances and car parks.

27. Forge and make use of official Lebanese documents, including, but not limited to, passports and identification documents.

Enclosure 1

Persons convicted of collaborating with the enemy

No.	Name	*Judgement*
1.	Ihab Muhammad al-Haj (Palestinian)	Sentenced to three years of hard labour and stripped of civil rights.
2.	Muhammad Nimr Bassam	Sentenced to 10 years hard labour and stripped of civil rights.
3.	Faysal Ghazi Muqallad	Sentenced to hard labour for life, fined 100,000 Lebanese pounds and stripped of civil rights; acquitted of crimes under the Penal Code, articles 471, 471/454, 463 and 463/454 due to lack of evidence.
4.	Mahmud Rafi'	Sentenced to death.
5.	Walid Isam Karam	Two years hard labour and stripped of civil rights.
6.	Ibrahim Khalil Ma'ruf (Jordanian)	Both acquitted due to lack of evidence.
	Atif Khidr al-Janazirah (Palestinian)	
7.	Yusuf Muhammad al-Hajj Ali	Sentenced to hard labour for life and stripped of civil rights.
8.	Hana Khalil Isa	Sentence to 10 years hard labour.
9.	Ali Hussein Mantash	Sentenced to death.
10.	Wafiq Sa'd al-Din al-Habtah	Sentenced to two years hard labour and stripped of civil rights.
11.	Hasan Ahmad al-Hussein	Sentenced to death and confiscation of possessions.
12.	Ziyad Khalil al-Sa'di	Sentenced to 20 years hard labour, stripped of civil rights and possessions confiscated; charges under the Penal Code, article 275, were dropped because the relevant conditions were not met.

Enclosure 2

Collaborators facing charges before the Permanent Military Tribunal

No.	*Status*	*Name*	*Father's name*	*Surname*	*Action taken*		*Offence*
1.	Accused	Usamah	Muhammad Ali	Birri	Detained	Interrogated	The first individual was in contact with Israeli intelligence and provided information that facilitated its aggression against Lebanon. The second collaborated with Israeli intelligence and persuaded the first to cooperate with it in order to facilitate its aggression against Lebanon. Both entered enemy territory.
2.	Accused	Antoine	Salim	Atmah			
3.	Accused	Marwan	Kamil	Faqih	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with the enemy; providing the enemy with secret information related to State security; entering enemy territory.
4.	Accused	Jawdat	Salman	al-Hakim	Detained	Interrogated	The first individual collaborated with, contacted and served as an informant for the Israeli enemy in order to facilitate the victory of its forces and provided it with means of committing aggression against Lebanon. The second and third were accessories to those crimes. All three entered enemy territory.
5.	Accused	Sami	Ilya	Farhat	Arrested in absentia		
6.	Accused	Amir	Farhat	al-Halabi	Arrested in absentia		
7.	Accused	Ali	Dib	Jarrah	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with and providing information to the enemy, and photographing military installations belonging to the Lebanese Army and the Syrian Army. The first individual used a forged passport and identification document.
8.	Accused	Yusuf	Dib	Jarrah	Detained	Interrogated	
9.	Accused	Jawdat	Muhammad Khayr Allah	al-Khawjah	Detained		Contacting the Israeli enemy and its intelligence agencies in order to provide the enemy with means of committing aggression against Lebanon. The accused also served as an informant for the enemy, providing it with information regarding the Army and the resistance.

No	Status	Name	Father's name	Surname	Action taken		Offence
10.	Accused	Haytham	Rajih	al-Sahmarani	Detained	Interrogated	The first, second and third individuals served as informants for and were in contact with the Israeli enemy in order to provide it with means of committing aggression against Lebanon. Their actions led to the desired outcome. They also knowingly contacted enemy agents and spies and entered enemy territory. The fourth individual was an accessory to the crime of contacting the enemy.
11.	Accused	Sahirah	Rajih	al-Sahmarani	Arrested in absentia		
12.	Accused	Muhammad Amin	al-Amin	Khaz'al	Arrested in absentia		
13.	Accused	Raghidah	Ahmad	Dahir	Detained	Interrogated	
14.	Accused	Ghazwan	Abd	Shahin	Detained		Collaborating and maintaining ties with the Israeli enemy; entering military centres in order to obtain documents and information for the benefit of the enemy and undermine the security of those centres; obtaining secret maps, coordinates and documents pertaining to Army brigades, equipment and officers.
15.	Accused	Hasan	Yusuf	Ammar	Detained		Communicating with the Mossad and providing it with information concerning the Israeli pilot Ron Arad.
16.	Accused	Ili	Hana	Zahrah	Detained		Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and providing it with information concerning the resistance and the Army.
17.	Accused	Hussein	Muhammad	Ali Musa	Detained		Collaborating with and serving as informants for the Israeli enemy in order to facilitate the victory of its forces; selling drugs; providing information on civilian and military sites, as well as political party figures; entering enemy territory.
18.	Accused	Ahmad	Hasan	Abdullah	Arrested in absentia		
19.	Accused	Ja'far	Hussein	Halawi	Detained		
20.	Accused	Wasim	Musa	Musa			
21.	Accused	Haytham	Na'if	al-Zahir	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and providing it with information on Lebanese and Syrian civilian and military sites; entering enemy territory.

No.	Status	Name	Father's name	Surname	Action taken		Offence
22.	Accused	Ali	Adnan	Dabbus	Detained		Contacting and communicating with the Israeli intelligence agencies in order to provide them with information concerning the Israeli pilot Ron Arad.
23.	Accused	Mahmud	Qasim	Rafi'	Detained	Interrogated	Committing acts of terrorism and carrying out targeted killings; serving on behalf of enemy intelligence and providing it with means of committing aggression against Lebanon; disclosing information to the enemy.
24.	Accused	Muhammad	Qasim	Ghaddar	Detained		Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and its intelligence agencies.
25.	Accused	Fahim	Yusuf	Alam	Arrested in absentia		
26.	Accused	Leon	Sarkis	Tawqajian	Arrested in absentia		
27.	Accused	Muhsin	Hasan	Sham'un	Detained		Collaborating with and serving as informants for the Mossad in order to facilitate the victory of its forces and providing information on the Army and the resistance.
28.	Accused	Jamal	Hussein	Sham'un			
29.	Accused	Mahmud	Qasim	Rafi'	Detained		Serving enemy intelligence and providing it with means to commit aggression; aiding and abetting enemy agents; communicating with the enemy and disclosing information; committing acts of terrorism; possession and use of forged civil-status certificates provided by an Israeli intelligence officer.
30.	Accused	Hussein	Sulayman	Khattab	Arrested in absentia		
31.	Accused	Mansur	Habib	Diyab	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and providing it with information and documents concerning civilian locations and military sites and personnel; communicating with the enemy in order to provide it with information to commit aggression against Lebanon.

No.	Status	Name	Father's name	Surname	Action taken		Offence
32.	Accused	Muhammad	Hussein	Breiss	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with and serving as informants for the Israeli enemy and its intelligence agencies; providing the enemy with information in order to facilitate its acts of aggression.
33.	Accused	Jurjus	Elias	Farah	Detained		Collaborating with the enemy, providing it with information on civilian and military locations, facilitating the victory of its forces, entering enemy territory and possession of weapons and explosives.
34.	Accused	Jean	Elias	Farah	Arrested in absentia		
35.	Accused	Ahmad	Shibli	Salih	Arrested in absentia		
36.	Accused	Faris	Musa	al-Qasis	Arrested in absentia		
37.	Accused	Adib	As'ad	al-Alam	Detained		Collaborating with Israeli enemy intelligence. The first and second individuals provided the enemy with information on military posts and Syrian and Lebanese civilian sites and establishments in order to facilitate its acts of aggression and the victory of its forces. The first individual, a member of the military, spied for the enemy and provided it with information on military posts. He also used a forged civil-status certificate and was in possession of military weapons.
38.	Accused	Nicola	As'ad	Habib	Arrested in absentia		
39.	Accused	Hayah	Quzhaya	al-Salumi	Detained		
40.	Accused	Michel	Khalil	Abduh	Detained		Providing the Israeli enemy with coordinates of Lebanese Army positions and those of the resistance, including positions and bridges that were bombed in the course of the July 2006 aggression; collaborating with the Mossad; entering enemy territory.
41.	Accused	Joseph	Ilyahu	Kalash	Arrested in absentia		
42.	Accused	Natan	Ilyahu	Kalash	Arrested in absentia		

No.	Status	Name	Father's name	Surname	Action taken		Offence
43.	Accused	Muhammad	al-Sayyid	Ridwan	Detained		Communicating and collaborating with the Israeli enemy and serving as informants; providing the enemy with information on civilian locations and military positions of the resistance that were bombed by Israeli aircraft, as well as on political figures; selling drugs; entering enemy territory.
44.	Accused	Fawzi	Tanyus	al-Alam	Detained		
45.	Accused	Sa'id	Tanyus	al-Alam	Detained		
46.	Accused	Yusuf	Ya'qub	al-Alam	Detained		
47.	Accused	Ili	Ya'qub	al-Alam	Detained		
48.	Accused	Wajih	Tawfiq	Murad	Detained		
49.	Accused	Ahmad	Shibli	Salih	Arrested in absentia		
50.	Accused	George	Hana	Assaf	Arrested in absentia		
51.	Accused	Fahim	Yusuf	Alam	Arrested in absentia		
52.	Accused	Nimr	Tanyus	al-Alam	Arrested in absentia		
53.	Accused	Ziyad	Ahmad	al-Humsi	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with an Israeli enemy intelligence officer; gathering information and conveying it to that officer; carrying out assignments at his direction; possession of military weapons and ammunition.
54.	Accused	Khalid	Abdullah	Alqan	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with the enemy and providing it with information on civilian and military sites, as well as political and military figures; serving as informants for the enemy.
55.	Accused	Shahid	Shahadah	Tumiyah	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with Israeli enemy intelligence and providing it with critical information on and the precise coordinates of secret military and security sites and positions; providing the enemy with information concerning the military; entering enemy territory.

No.	Status	Name	Father's name	Surname	Action taken		Offence
56.	Accused	Sa'ib	Muhammad	Awn	Detained		Collaborating with and serving as informants for the Israeli enemy; providing it with information on and the coordinates of civilian and military sites, as well as political figures; selling drugs; entering enemy territory.
57.	Accused	Muhammad	Hasan	Abdullah	Detained		
58.	Accused	Nabil	Ali	Zaytun	Detained		
59.	Accused	Musa	Ali	Musa	Detained		Communicating with the Israeli enemy and providing it with information that allowed it to commit aggression against Lebanon.
60.	Accused	Ali	Muhammad	Suwayd	Arrested in absentia		
61.	Accused	Ahmad	Hussein	Abdullah	Arrested in absentia		
62.	Accused	Ali	Hasan	Ghusayn	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and entering enemy territory.
63.	Accused	Yusuf	Ibrahim Ahmad	Iskandar	Detained		Communicating with Mossad agents.
64.	Accused	Anwar	Muhammad	Sa'd Allah	Detained	Interrogated	Communicating with Israeli agents and possession of weapons.
65.	Accused	Adil	Muhammad	Kabid	Detained	Interrogated	
66.	Accused	Muhammad	Dib	Kayid	Detained		Communicating by telephone with the Mossad.
67.	Accused	Mahmud	Qasim	Rafi'	Detained	Interrogated	Forming a gang; joining an enemy intelligence network and providing it with means of committing aggression against Lebanon; contacting and collaborating with the enemy; finding housing to shelter its agents; committing acts of terrorism; entering enemy territory.
68.	Accused	Ibrahim	Muhammad	Yasin	Arrested in absentia		
69.	Accused	Hussein	Sulayman	Khattab	Arrested in absentia		
70.	Accused	Mahmud	Qasim	Rafi'	Detained	Interrogated	Forming a gang and providing the enemy with means of committing aggression against Lebanon; contacting and collaborating with the enemy; finding housing to shelter its agents; joining an intelligence network; revealing information to the enemy; entering enemy territory.

No.	Status	Name	Father's name	Surname	Action taken		Offence
71.	Accused	Ili	Id	Muni'	Detained		Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and recruiting individuals to work on behalf of Israeli intelligence.
72.	Accused	George	Id	Muni'	Detained		
73.	Accused	Hasan	Ahmad	Shihab	Detained		Collaborating with and spying for the enemy; committing acts of terrorism; entering enemy territory.
74.	Accused	Jamal	Ni'mah	Daw	Arrested in absentia		
75.	Accused	Rafiq	Mahmud	al-Barqashi	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with and serving as informants for the Israeli enemy and its intelligence agencies; providing it with the coordinates of civilian and military sites, as well as information on political figures; entering enemy territory.
76.	Accused	Muhammad	Ali	Barakat	Detained		Collaborating with Israeli intelligence and providing it with information on the resistance and Hizbullah.
77.	Accused	Hasan	Ahmad	Abdullah	Arrested in absentia		
78.	Accused	Badi'	Khalid	Mityas	Detained		Contacting and collaborating with Israeli intelligence.
79.	Accused	Khalid	Elias	Mityas	Arrested in absentia		
80.	Accused	Hasan	Muhammad Ali	Yasin	Detained		Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and providing it with information on military and security positions; entering enemy territory.
81.	Accused	Fu'ad	Ali	Sha'ban			
82.	Accused	Jean	Fu'ad	Zanqul	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and providing it with information on security personnel and Hizbullah officials; providing enemy intelligence agencies with detailed information about Ramzi Nahra, thereby facilitating his assassination.
83.	Accused	Sami	Ilya	Farhat	Arrested in absentia		
84.	Accused	Jean	As'ad	Nahra	Detained	Interrogated	
85.	Accused	Mahdi	Ali	Yasin	Detained	Interrogated	Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and entering its territory.
86.	Accused	Najah	Hussein	al-Abdullah	Arrested in absentia		

No.	Status	Name	Father's name	Surname	Action taken	Offence
87.	Accused	Imad	Munir	Makhul	Arrested in absentia	
88.	Accused	Robert	Edmond	Kafuri	Detained	Collaborating with and providing information to the Israeli enemy; serving as informants for the enemy in order to facilitate the victory of its forces and its acts of aggression and terrorism; attempting to assassinate an individual by means of an explosive device; entering enemy territory; possession and transport of explosives. The first and second individuals forged official Lebanese documents and used those forged documents.
89.	Accused	Muhammad	Ibrahim	Awad	Detained	
90.	Accused	Ilyas	Riyadh	Karam	Arrested in absentia	
91.	Accused	Munir	Antoine	Saqar	Detained	Collaborating with and serving as informants for the enemy and its intelligence agencies; providing it with banking and commercial information; entering enemy territory.
92.	Accused	Michel	Antoine	Saqar		
93.	Accused	Iman	Husny	Ayub	Detained	Collaborating with the Israeli enemy and entering its territory.
94.	Accused	Hussein	Sulayman	Khattab	Arrested in absentia	
95.	Accused	Muhammad	Sulayman	Khattab	Arrested in absentia	
96.	Accused	Amin	Ibrahim	al-Baba	Detained	Collaborating with and contacting the Israeli enemy, entering its territory and serving as an informant.
97.	Accused	Muhammad	Abdulrahman	al-Ali	Detained	Collaborating and communicating with the Israeli enemy.

No.	Status	Name	Father's name	Surname	Action taken		Offence
98.	Accused	Yusif	Maron	Abdush	Detained		The first individual collaborated with the Israeli enemy and sold drugs and smuggled them into enemy territory. The second individual collaborated with and served as an informant for the Israeli enemy. The third individual collaborated with the Israeli enemy and its intelligence agencies and provided them with information on sites and houses belonging to Hizbullah and its personnel. The fourth and fifth individuals sold drugs and smuggled them into enemy territory.
99.	Accused	Emil	Hanna	Abu Safi	Detained		
100.	Accused	Ali	Mahmud	al-Mallah	Detained		
101.	Accused	Kayid	Muhammad	Barru	Arrested in absentia		
102.	Accused	Ja`far	Hussein	Hallawi	Detained		
103.	Accused	Ahmad	Salih	Qahwaji	Detained	Interrogated	Attempting to collaborate with the enemy by contacting one of its agents; impersonating a member of the military.

Enclosure 3

Persons accused of collaborating with the enemy by an investigating judge

No.	*Status*	*Name*	*Father's name*	*Surname*	*Offence*
1.	Detained	Sharbal	Dahir	al-Qazi	Collaborating with the enemy.
2.	Detained	Tariq	Muhammad	al-Rab'ah	Collaborating with the enemy.
3.	Detained	Philip	Hanna	Sadir	Collaborating with the enemy.
4.	Arrested in absentia	Francis	Wadi'	Abu Ghanim	
5.	Detained	Nasir	Mahmud	Nadir	Collaborating with the enemy.
6.	Detained	Nawal	George	Ma'luf	
7.	Detained	Mustafa	Hassan	Sa'id	
8.	Detained	Samir	Joseph	Abu Arraj	
9.	Detained	Wajih	Tawfiq	Murad	Collaborating with the enemy.
10.	Detained	Ali	Zaki	Idris	Collaborating with the enemy.
11.	Detained	Boutros	Habib	Sulayman	Collaborating with the enemy.
12.	Detained	Sami	George Sam'an	al-Khuri	Collaborating with the enemy.
13.	Wanted	Jamal	Ahmad	al-Tufayli	Collaborating with the enemy.
14.	Wanted	Fu'ad	George	Tannus	Collaborating with the enemy.
15.	Detained	Ili	Shukri	al-Khuri	Collaborating with the enemy.
16.	Detained	Milad	Khalil	Ayd	Collaborating with the enemy.
17.	Detained	Fayiz	Wajih	Karam	Collaborating with the enemy.
18.	Wanted	Ilyas	Riyad	Karam	Collaborating with the enemy.
19.	Wanted	Adnan	Salim	al-Haddad	Collaborating with the enemy.
20.	Wanted	Caroline	Ya'qub	Tannus	Collaborating with the enemy.
21.	Wanted	Ali	Adulrasul	Khawajah	Collaborating with the enemy.
22.	Wanted	Zaynab	Hassan	Muhammad	
23.	Wanted	Muhammad	Ali	Khawajah	
24.	Wanted	Rim	Ali	Khawajah	
25.	Wanted	Malak	Ali	Khawajah	

United Nations S/2010/461

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 September 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 1 September 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept paper for the Security Council summit on "Ensuring the Security Council's effective role in maintaining international peace and security", to take place on 23 September 2010 at the level of Heads of State and Government (see annex).

I should be grateful if the enclosed concept paper could be circulated as a document of the Security Council in respect of its consideration of the issue of maintenance of international peace and security.

(*Signed*) Ertuğrul **Apakan**
Permanent Representative

10-50567 (E) 080910

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Annex to the letter dated 1 September 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept paper on ensuring the Security Council's effective role in maintaining international peace and security

Proposal

1. Turkey will assume the Presidency of the Security Council for the month of September 2010. In this context, it is the intention of the Turkish Government to convene a meeting of the Council at the level of Heads of State and Government on the afternoon of Thursday, 23 September. The meeting will provide a unique opportunity to conduct a strategic review, at the highest political level, of the evolving international security environment and of the Council's growing role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. The meeting will be chaired by the President of the Republic of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, and formal letters of invitation will be extended to the members of the Council in August. It will be held in the "briefing" format, in which the Secretary-General is invited to make an initial presentation, followed by interventions by the members of the Council.

3. At the end of the meeting, which will be limited to two hours, the intention is to adopt a presidential statement (or declaration), the first draft of which will be circulated informally in mid-August.

Rationale

4. The United Nations was created to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Sixty-five years later, we live in a world of new and emerging threats to international peace and security that could not have been anticipated in 1945. Yet, the threat of violent conflict and the costs of war — to individuals, communities, States and regions — remain the core challenges facing the United Nations. As the body with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the world looks to the Security Council to act decisively to prevent conflict, protect populations and end wars and prevent them from recurring. It is therefore imperative that the Council constantly take a fresh look at the evolving international security environment and its implications for the United Nations and the Council itself.

5. The first such strategic reassessment took place nearly 20 years ago. Following the end of the cold war, the Council dramatically expanded the pace and scope of its activities, utilizing for the first time the full range of tools provided under the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, the first-ever summit meeting of the Security Council took place on 31 January 1992. In the Summit statement, the Council stressed the importance of strengthening and increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations. The Council also invited the Secretary-General to present his analysis and recommendations to that effect, in particular with a view to enhancing the capacity of the Organization for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

6. The report of the Secretary-General in June 1992, entitled "An agenda for peace" (A/47/277-S/24111), presented a wide-ranging analysis of the changing security landscape and made several recommendations regarding the areas of action identified by the Security Council. Importantly, it also added a new concept to the lexicon, post-conflict peacebuilding, in an attempt to complete the circle of peace.

7. In 2010, as in 1992, the Council still depends on these core operational tools — preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (itself a means of conflict prevention) — for addressing a widening spectrum of complex challenges to international peace and security. Over the past two decades, the United Nations has made considerable progress in refining and strengthening these individual tools. It has also come to appreciate the essentially political nature of these instruments. It is time, from a political perspective, to evaluate their collective and individual effectiveness in the face of changing circumstances, to review and reassess how the pieces fit together, and to identify measures to fill in the gaps and/or to sharpen these and other instruments as appropriate.

8. The rationale for holding another such broad strategic debate at the level of Heads of State and Government is thus compelling. Through face-to-face exchanges among the top decision makers, it will be possible both to identify the most acute challenges and dangers of the day and to chart how the United Nations might best help to steer change into peaceful courses.

9. In fact, it was long proposed to hold such meetings on a regular basis. Since 1992, however, only five summit meetings have been held. Just one of them, in 2000, took a broad overview of the international security environment and pledged to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing each stage of conflict. Now, five years after the 2005 World Summit, a decade since the seminal report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi report, see A/55/305-S/2000/809), and almost two decades after the first Summit meeting of the Council, another such high-level meeting is needed to take stock and to look ahead. In so doing, Council members can reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter. They can initiate a process of defining and articulating a bolder, more comprehensive and more forward-looking vision of the Council's role in the maintenance of international peace and security today and into the future.

Focus

10. As noted at the outset, it is proposed that the summit-level meeting of the Council focus on two sets of questions: one, how the international security environment is evolving, and two, what the implications of these changes are for the way the Council goes about fulfilling its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In this context, we could also discuss to what degree did the reforms since 2000 (and in particular those of 2005) strengthen the United Nations, what was left unaddressed and where are the gaps.

11. We live in a world of new and evolving threats to international peace and security. The core threat that the United Nations was created to prevent — war between States — has been largely overtaken by regional and global security threats of unprecedented complexity, including intra-State armed conflict with regional dimensions, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational organized crime. Besides, growing recognition of the linkages between security and development has given new prominence to the impact of poverty,

global economic crisis, infectious diseases and environmental degradation on the security environment. These challenges are unconstrained by borders, threaten human security as well as the security of States, and emanate from non-State actors as well as States. In an interconnected world, no country can insulate itself from these threats nor solve these challenges alone. They demand a strengthened United Nations and a renewed commitment to effective multilateral cooperation through the Security Council.

12. Given its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, these developments compel in particular the Security Council to be more active, comprehensive and collaborative. Active in the sense that the Council must play a stronger role in addressing all threats and challenges affecting international peace and security; comprehensive in the sense that it should not confine itself only to peacekeeping, but pay even more attention to preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding, and do so in a coherent manner; and finally, collaborative in the sense that it must discharge its responsibilities in cooperation with its partners not only within the United Nations system, such as the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Economic and Social Council, but also with all other major stakeholders, in particular with the regional and subregional organizations and international financial institutions. The summit provides an opportunity for the Council to reaffirm its commitment in this direction and reinvigorate its efforts.

13. Several of the key pieces of such a process are already in place. Within the last year alone, the Council has addressed preventive diplomacy, transitions and exit strategies in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as related reports from the Secretary-General. In this regard, the "New horizon" non-paper on peacekeeping[1] and recent reports on mediation and on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict merit particular attention, as does the recent report of the co-facilitators on the review of the Peacebuilding Commission.

14. Likewise, the Council meetings, statements and resolutions on the rule of law, women and peace and security, children in armed conflict, protection of civilians in armed conflict, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and organized crime and trafficking have contributed to strengthening the Council's understanding of and preparedness to deal with new and evolving threats to international peace and security. Increased interaction and collaboration with regional and subregional organizations has also been high on the Council's agenda as evidenced by the meeting with several such key organizations in January, as well as the joint meeting between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in July.

15. There is thus an increasing convergence of views among the United Nations membership on the complex nature of the international security environment, as well as on the means to address emerging threats and challenges. However, the multilateral system still struggles to translate this broad accord into practical, effective and mutually reinforcing steps on the ground.

16. The summit meeting in September could thus be an opportunity to re-energize the whole process; provide a comprehensive political framework to integrate the ongoing processes; restore confidence in the ability of the United Nations to prevent

[1] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "A new partnership agenda: charting a new horizon for UN peacekeeping" (New York, July 2009).

and resolve conflicts; reaffirm the Council's primary role in maintaining international peace and security; and recommit the Council to discharging this responsibility in cooperation with its partners.

Outcome

17. It has been almost two decades since the Council, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, last tried to pull together these parallel but interrelated activities, to put the individual pieces of the puzzle in their rightful places, and thus to create a full and interactive picture of the international security environment and of the means available to the Council to address contemporary and emerging threats to international peace and security.

18. By providing a comprehensive political framework to integrate these processes and by clarifying its own role, the Council could reaffirm its will and ability to play a stronger role in the political settlement of disputes and in the implementation of peace processes. It could also stress the importance of sustained engagement with countries in conflict. A discussion of this nature could help shift the debate from exit strategies to integration among different elements and tasks of bringing peace to a country or region.

19. The presidential statement (or declaration) to be adopted at the end of the meeting could underscore the Council's resolve on these matters, while providing clearer guidance and a more integrated framework for United Nations efforts in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. It could also be used to launch a process aimed at reviewing the progress made in the efforts of the United Nations to achieve peace and security in the twenty-first century, as well as the efficacy of its tools and institutional arrangements under the Charter to this end.

United Nations S/2010/462

Security Council

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3 September 2010

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Letter dated 1 September 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey herewith the concept note regarding the briefing on counter-terrorism, which will be held in the Security Council on 27 September 2010 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the enclosed concept note were circulated as a document of the Security Council under the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts".

(*Signed*) Ertuğrul **Apakan**
Permanent Representative

10-50561 (E) 090910

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Annex to the letter dated 1 September 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note

Thematic meeting of the Security Council on counter-terrorism

Turkey, in its capacity as the President of the Security Council in September 2010, would like to hold a thematic meeting of the Security Council on counter-terrorism. The meeting is planned to be held on 27 September in a "briefing" format.

Background

The United Nations plays a central role in countering global terrorism. Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), adopted following the heinous attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, constituted a milestone in the efforts exerted at the United Nations level. It identified a number of measures to be adopted and implemented by Member States and established the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of those measures. Later in 2006 the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, which was of significant importance to reaffirm the collective commitment of the international community to combat the common threat of terrorism.

Furthermore, all three subsidiary bodies of the Security Council related to counter-terrorism, namely the 1267, 1373 and 1540 Committees, have played important roles within their mandates and made considerable progress since their establishment. These Committees have increased, particularly in recent years, their effectiveness by rendering themselves more transparent, improving their working methods and placing more emphasis on human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism.

That said, after almost a decade since the adoption of the Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), and despite the determined endeavours by the United Nations and Member States, terrorism still continues today to be a serious threat to international peace and security. In some regions there has even been an increase in terrorist attacks and other illegal activities carried out by terrorist groups.

That is mainly because terrorism has an evolving nature. Terrorist organizations do not relent in adjusting and readjusting their tactics and techniques in organization and financing of and recruitment for their terrorist activities. For this reason, it is necessary for the international community to also adapt and evolve its response at the national, regional and global levels.

In this regard, it is equally important that we undertake this effort collectively. Indeed, for the fight against terrorism to succeed, there is an absolute need to act decisively, but to do so with a clear and common perspective. Terrorism, which can have no justification under any circumstances, is not a unique problem of a certain country or region. We are all exposed to this threat. Thus, a firm and united stance by all Member States is required.

Moreover, terrorism is a crime against humanity that violates fundamental human rights, particularly the right to life. Therefore, we should pay utmost

attention in order that terrorism, is not, under any circumstances, associated with any culture, religion or ethnic group. This only weakens our collective resolve and united stance in a way that plays into the hands of terrorists and extremists.

While countering terrorism, there is also a need to take into account the political, economic and social factors that terrorists exploit. It is also important that respect for human rights and the rule of law have a central place in all counter-terrorism efforts. In other words, the fight against terrorism should be a joint effort with a holistic approach and long-term dedication. Our resolve to fight this scourge should be firm and unyielding, while our responses must be innovative and adaptable to changing circumstances.

It is within this frame of mind that Turkey, in its capacity as the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, organized a meeting on 17 June 2010 in Ankara. The meeting, which was held with the participation of the members of the Security Council and relevant United Nations officials, set the stage for a focused discussion on the increasing challenges emanating from the threat of terrorism and how to more effectively address them at the United Nations level.

We would like to recall that an informal summary note by the Chairman of the meeting was circulated earlier to the members of the Security Council. One of the main points emphasized by the participants at that meeting was that countering terrorism needs to be kept as a priority on the international agenda and more political attention should be given to the fight against this scourge at the level of the Security Council.

It has been argued that Council's continued attention in addressing this threat could serve as a deterrent in itself, while providing a renewed impetus and new ideas to the efforts to redress the gaps that hamper the effectiveness of the combat against terrorism. The guidance and direction that may come from the Council in this respect are considered to be of paramount importance.

Objective

With this understanding, Turkey, as the host country of the Ankara meeting, expressed its intention to further pursue the discussions in New York. In fact, the thematic meeting proposed to be held in September in the Security Council would be organized as a follow-up to the discussions in Ankara and in the light of the views and suggestions raised there. At the thematic meeting, we would suggest to:

- recognize the efforts, activities and achievements of the relevant United Nations bodies, including the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, and encourage such efforts
- focus on the gaps and challenges in the implementation of the obligations identified in relevant resolutions
- deliberate on the issues that need more attention by the Security Council
- discuss what steps or measures should and could be taken by the Security Council to better address the challenges.

Outcome

It is our intention, at the end of the thematic meeting, to have a presidential statement adopted that would send a strong message confirming the importance of

reinforced international cooperation and the determination of the Security Council in the fight against terrorism, and call upon Member States to work more closely with a view to ensuring effective implementation of the obligations indicated in the relevant resolutions and seamless cooperation among all Member States.

United Nations A/64/911–S/2010/463

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 17
The situation in Afghanistan

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 64/11 and Security Council resolution 1917 (2010), in which the Council requested me to report on developments in Afghanistan every three months.

2. This report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including those of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and reviews the situation in the country since my previous report, of 16 June 2010 (A/64/872-S/2010/318). This report provides a summary of key political and security developments, including the Kabul Conference and preparations for national legislative elections, as well as regional and international events related to Afghanistan. In addition, I briefed the Security Council on developments in Afghanistan on 23 July 2010, following my participation in the Kabul Conference.

3. The Security Council visited Afghanistan from 21 to 25 June. The Council, during the visit, reaffirmed its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan, reviewed progress made by the Government of Afghanistan, and assessed the status of implementation of relevant Council resolutions.

II. Political and security developments

Political developments

4. The main political development during the reporting period was the holding of the Kabul Conference on 20 July 2010. The Conference, co-chaired by the Government and the United Nations, represented a milestone in Afghanistan's

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transition towards the full exercise of its sovereign authority. It was the largest international high-level event held in Kabul since the beginning of the Bonn process, with the participation of 76 international delegations.

5. The Conference marked a decisive first step within the Kabul process, which began with the inaugural speech of President Hamid Karzai in 2009, and through which Afghans will gradually assume full responsibility for their own security, governance, and economic and social development. The Government of Afghanistan, in preparation for the Conference, drafted 23 national priority strategies and programmes, including the national security policy and the Afghan peace and reintegration programme. It also designed a strategy for the transfer of lead responsibility for security on a province-by-province basis, according to clearly defined conditions.

6. Preparations for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 18 September 2010 were also a major political focus during this period. The publication of the final list of polling centre locations four weeks in advance was an important development that will increase the transparency of the elections. All other technical elements of the electoral preparations have also proceeded on schedule, including the finalization of the list of candidates and the beginning of the official campaign period.

7. Parliamentary elections have taken on increased significance because of the political impasse between the executive and legislative branches over nominations to the Cabinet. The impasse, which has existed since January, has left several cabinet seats unfilled. The Wolesi Jirga (Lower House of the National Assembly) approved five of seven new Cabinet nominees on 28 June prior to the parliamentary recess, including for the Ministries of Public Works, Refugees and Repatriation, Borders and Tribal Affairs, Commerce, and the Interior. Nominees for Higher Education and Transport were rejected, while five other ministerial posts remain vacant. The two rejected nominees were Hazara, sparking protests on the part of the Hazara community.

Electoral activities

8. The Independent Electoral Commission on 12 July announced the final list of candidates for the national assembly elections. The final list reflected the exclusion of 36 candidates by the Commission on the ground of links to illegal armed groups. The Electoral Complaints Commission, thereafter, excluded additional candidates for technical irregularities, bringing the total number of excluded candidates to 76 as at 5 September. Twelve of the excluded candidates are women. As at 5 September, the number of candidates eligible to contest is 2,513, including 397 (or 15 per cent) women and 52 Kuchis (42 men and 10 women), who will stand for the 249 parliamentary seats. Two hundred and twenty-nine of the sitting 249 members of Parliament are seeking re-election.

9. The election campaign began on 23 June, on schedule, following the finalization of the list of candidates. Lively campaigns have been observed in the more secure areas of the country, including through television and billboards both in the capital and in the provinces. I am particularly encouraged by the vigorous campaigning of female candidates in these areas. Campaigning is less dynamic in less secure areas, and is conducted out of the public eye, especially in some districts in the south.

10. The Independent Electoral Commission, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has met all of its logistical deadlines and has kept the electoral timetable on track. Electoral preparations are proceeding smoothly from a technical and operational standpoint. Major procurement has been finalized and all sensitive materials, including ballot papers, are in the country. The packing of polling centre and polling station kits was successfully completed and the distribution of materials was initiated on time. Public information campaigns and outreach activities administered by the Independent Electoral Commission are also on schedule. The Commission has been able to recruit the staff it needs and training of the staff has been conducted as planned. A Commission-administered voter registration update concluded on 12 August, and 376,081 additional voter registration cards were issued, of which 40 per cent were issued to women.

11. The Independent Electoral Commission, with United Nations support, has established a wide-ranging set of fraud-mitigation measures to address potential irregularities, such as the removal of more than 6,000 former polling staff and increased fraud mitigation measures in the polling centres that witnessed the greatest number of irregularities over the past three elections. My Special Representative, on 23 June, commented on the vetting of candidates, stressing the need for a thorough and constructive approach to the process. He further issued a press release on 12 August highlighting several key steps to be taken for the upcoming elections. He called in particular for the Independent Electoral Commission to make the polling centre list public, encouraged observers (international and national) and candidate and party agents to register to observe the elections, condemned violence against candidates, and urged voters to follow the electoral campaigns and vote for their preferred candidates on 18 September. The Commission, by 4 September, accredited 13 domestic observation institutions, 17 international observation institutions, 17 international media, 24 domestic media, and agents representing 10 political parties and 1,229 candidates. As at 4 September, the Commission has accredited a total of 223,727 observers. Technical support to the elections provided by the United Nations has included daily collaboration with the Electoral Commission's Field Operations Unit, responsible for identifying polling centres, recruiting polling centre staff, and packing and distributing polling centre materials. The United Nations chief technical adviser on elections provides senior-level guidance to both the Chair and the secretariat of the Independent Electoral Commission on critical decisions. Technical advisers assist the operational capacity of the Electoral Complaints Commission, both in logistical and substantive matters. This support has so far been effective, even with a reduced presence compared to the 2009 elections, because of the growing capacity of the Afghan electoral authorities.

12. The Electoral Complaints Commission, with support from UNDP and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, has been addressing the need to establish provincial Electoral Complaints Commission offices. Unlike past elections, in 2010 most of the complaints will be adjudicated at the provincial level while the central Electoral Complaints Commission will only hear appeals. The Electoral Complaints Commission, pursuant to the electoral law, serves as the final arbiter in the candidate vetting process. The Commission had received, by 6 September, 1,503 complaints throughout the country regarding campaign irregularities and reports of intimidation and bias of provincial staff of the Independent Electoral Commission towards candidates, of which 350 have so far

been adjudicated. It has undertaken training programmes for its provincial commissioners and staff to ensure that it has the substantive capacity to fulfil its mandate. It conducted a second round of training for the 104 provincial commissioners and more than 200 of their support staff during the last week of August; the training was focused on the organizational rules of procedure for the polling day and complaints arising during the polling day. The establishment, in the short time available, of Electoral Complaints Commission offices across the country with sufficient capacity to adjudicate the complaints has proved challenging, however.

13. The security situation remains a cause for concern and creates enormous challenges in the electoral process. Widespread intimidation of candidates, particularly women, has been reported. As at 30 August, four candidates have been killed, while five agents campaigning for a female candidate were found dead in Herat on 29 August. Fragile security could lead to the occurrence of systematic fraud and irregularities. Measures that have been taken to mitigate such risks in the forthcoming parliamentary elections include coordinated work between the Independent Electoral Commission and the security institutions to assess the situation and to determine the final list of polling centres and the timing of its distribution. The delay in the finalization and public announcement of polling centres during the presidential elections in 2009 had led to confusion among the electorate, the inability of party and candidate agents to reach certain polling areas in time, and, in some instances, to fraud. In 2010, the Independent Electoral Commission has taken a proactive approach to finalizing the polling centre list well in advance of the polling day, and has retained the final authority to decide which polling centres may or may not open. The Commission supplied a list of polling centre locations to the Afghan National Security Forces in May. The Security Forces, on 8 August, provided the Commission with a detailed security assessment of each polling centre. The assessment concluded that 5,897 of the proposed 6,835 polling centres could be opened (88 per cent), similar to the 2009 polling centre figures. The Commission then undertook its own security assessment based on the data received by the Security Forces, and made the final list public on 18 August, stating that a total of 938 polling centres would not open (up from 797 in the list presented by the Commission in May). The Commission emphasized that this number may still decrease, depending on the security situation, but will not increase, a decision that my Special Representative had particularly emphasized as necessary. The Commission, in this manner, enhanced the transparency of the process, allowing voters to know well in advance where to cast their ballot.

14. The disenfranchisement of voters that may occur as a result of the geographical distribution of polling centres in certain areas is, however, a serious concern. The Independent Electoral Commission has taken measures to ensure that the nearest polling centres to those that it has decided not to open are adequately prepared, and have more polling stations for voters who may travel there.

Security situation

15. The security situation has continued to deteriorate in many parts of the country, the overall number of security incidents having increased by 69 per cent compared to the same months in 2009. This can be attributed to a combination of factors, including increased international troop levels and a corresponding increase in security operations by the Afghan National Security Forces, and increased

activities of anti-government elements. The reporting period recorded a rise in the number of incidents using improvised explosive devices, by 82 per cent compared to the same period in 2009. One device targeted a UNAMA convoy in Parwan Province, killing three police escorts and a driver. Complex suicide attacks involving multiple bombers doubled from the previous period to a rate of four per month and continued to target the guesthouses and offices of international civilian development agencies. Such attacks negatively affect the population's confidence in the ability of the Afghan and international security forces to uphold the rule of law and deliver essential social services.

16. Anti-government elements significantly increased their assassination campaign. During the reporting period, 21 people were reported to be assassinated each week, compared to seven per week in the previous period. The majority of assassinations continue to occur in the south and south-east, primarily targeting Government officials, civilians and members of the Afghan National Security Forces. Ten members of a humanitarian non-governmental organization were killed in southern Badakhshan Province when returning from a medical mission early in August. Both the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar claimed responsibility for the attack, but the actual perpetrators remain unknown.

17. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in January 2010 initiated the deployment of 34,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to support national security forces in their stabilization efforts. Large military operations by Government and international forces are focusing on Helmand and Kandahar to restore stability and enable Government institutions to provide services.

Security sector reform

18. Community-based defence initiatives across Afghanistan are intended to stem the spread of insurgency and mitigate the challenges associated with the recruitment and retention of the Afghan National Security Forces. UNAMA has provided advice to the Government and ISAF in the development of an overarching framework, within which all community-based defence initiatives will be subsumed and linked to reintegration efforts. My Special Representative has received assurances from both the Government and ISAF that the recruitment of *Police-e-Mahali* (Afghan Local Police) units across Afghanistan will reflect the country's ethnic and tribal composition. Ongoing training of recruits, which includes a human rights component, aims at ensuring that they are suitably prepared for possible inclusion in the National Security Forces. The Afghan Local Police will also be strictly defensive in nature and, finally, those units will be subordinate to the command and control of the Afghan National Security Forces.

19. UNAMA continues to monitor the evolution of the joint Government-ISAF transition plan, which aims to enable the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen further its ownership and leadership across all government functions and includes a joint Afghan-NATO *Inteqal* Board, co-chaired by the Afghan National Security Adviser, the NATO senior civilian representative and the ISAF Commander, and comprising the key Afghan and NATO/ISAF stakeholders, with my Special Representative as an observer. UNAMA played an advisory role in the drafting of the plan, encouraging in particular the alignment of its governance and development milestones with Afghan national priorities. This has been incorporated into the plan.

Peace and reintegration

20. President Karzai, on 29 June 2010, issued a presidential decree formally launching the peace, reconciliation and reintegration programme. This decree, which was in-line with the communiqué of the London Conference and followed the endorsement by the Consultative Peace Jirga of the Afghan peace and reintegration programme, designated the presidential adviser, Massoom Stanekzai, to lead the joint secretariat of the programme. The decree also required the creation of a financial oversight committee to support the establishment of a peace and reintegration trust fund. The Committee held its inaugural meeting on 27 July, chaired by the Minister of Finance, Omar Zakhilwal, during which the Government and donors formalized an agreement on the financial mechanisms that will be used to create a peace and reintegration trust fund. A presidential decree of 5 June further established a Detention Release Committee to review cases of suspected insurgents detained without evidence or charge. The Committee is part of the Government's efforts to foster goodwill and trust as it seeks to engage the armed opposition in a political process.

21. The High Peace Council, which will guide and support the Government's efforts to build on the outcomes of the Consultative Peace Jirga, was established on 4 September. My Special Representative has advocated broad representation of religious, ethnic and civil society groups, including women. He is expected to co-chair the Special Peace and Reintegration Sub-Committee, the major donor coordination mechanism that will make strategic recommendations to the programme.

22. The Monitoring Team operating under the direction of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) visited Afghanistan in June. The Committee concluded, on 30 July 2010, the review of its Consolidated List of individuals and entities subject to sanctions measures, undertaken pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008). The Committee determined that of the 488 entries on its Consolidated List, 443 (132 associated with the Taliban) remained appropriate, while 45 entries, 10 of which were formerly associated with the Taliban, were removed as a result of the review. Also, on 19 July, the Committee had approved the addition to the Consolidated List of three Afghan individuals involved in raising funds for the Taliban. The de-listing was generally welcomed and commended in Afghanistan as a practical step to facilitate the realization of the peace and reconciliation programme. A representative of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, however, described the announcement, in a television interview, as worrying, arguing that the de-listing process might lead to impunity for alleged perpetrators of war crimes.

Regional cooperation

23. The Government of Afghanistan continued its dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring countries. Bilateral talks in Islamabad between the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zalmai Rassoul, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, on 24 and 25 June confirmed a mutual desire to increase joint efforts to respond to security concerns and bolster economic cooperation. On 18 July the two Governments finalized their extensive negotiations on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement. The Agreement, which is essential to realizing the full economic potential of the two countries, will

now be reviewed by the competent legal authorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan prior to its presentation to both Parliaments for ratification.

24. My Special Representative continued to support regional initiatives and cooperation programmes through his good offices, in particular through the Kabul Silk Road initiative, which he co-chairs with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and which is attended by representatives of countries in the broader region. The initiative is helping to generate substantive interest and cooperation on key areas where concrete steps can be taken to address regional issues. The third meeting of the Kabul Silk Route initiative was held on 11 July, and focused on regional cooperation on counter-narcotics. The participants reviewed existing initiatives and started identifying gaps. They also agreed on the principle of shared responsibility and expressed their support for the national drug control strategy of the Government of Afghanistan.

25. The Afghan Foreign Ministry hosted a regional conference of representatives from regional bodies on the eve of the Kabul Conference. Those bodies included the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Islamic Development Bank, and the object of the conference was to discuss a coordination mechanism to improve regional cooperation. Participants agreed to establish a high-level Core Group of key regional bodies, which will (a) ensure high-level coordination of the Afghan component of regional cooperation frameworks among member States; (b) provide the political support of member countries to ensure that technical hurdles are promptly resolved; and (c) mobilize sufficient resources to meet programme commitments and recommendations. UNAMA participated in the meeting and will support the high-level Core Group.

26. President Karzai took part in the fourth trilateral summit meeting of the Presidents of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Tajikistan, in Tehran on 5 August. The leaders agreed to advance joint strategic projects to build railways and roads, and power stations and transmission lines between Tajikistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran via Afghanistan, and announced the establishment of joint committees to draw up short-, medium- and long-term strategies for trilateral cooperation. A quadrilateral summit was held on 18 August in Sochi, Russian Federation, at the invitation of President Dmitry A. Medvedev. President Karzai, President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan, and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan met with President Medvedev to discuss areas of priority focus and cooperation to advance economic development and stability in the region.

27. Other relevant regional cooperation meetings have been held during the reporting period, including on criminal, counter-narcotic and border management-related matters, with the presence of high-ranking officials from Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries. They included the workshop organized jointly by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on international cooperation on criminal matters (Astana, 20-22 July), the first meeting of the Chiefs of counter-narcotic police of the Economic Cooperation Organization member States (Tehran, 2 and 3 August), and the fourth senior officials meeting of the Triangular Initiative, held on 3 August within the framework of the Rainbow Strategy of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Moreover, a new round of joint operations was conducted on

2 August by the Afghan and Iranian forces and by Afghan and Pakistan forces, resulting in significant seizures of illicit drugs, including over 80 kg of heroin, 130 kg of opium and 55 kg of hashish, and in the arrest of more than 15 smugglers.

III. Transition to greater Afghan leadership

28. The major event during this reporting period was the Kabul Conference of 20 July, which the United Nations co-chaired with the Government. Attended by representatives of 16 countries and 14 international organizations, the Conference demonstrated the will and increasing capacity of Afghans to assume full leadership and ownership of their future. The Kabul process contains at its heart a dual commitment: a renewed commitment by the Government to the Afghan people to improve security, governance and economic opportunities, and a corresponding pledge by the international community to Afghanistan to align its resources and activities in support of the transition to effective and accountable Afghan leadership. The communiqué of the Conference reflected this partnership and outlined the concrete steps required to realize such mutual commitments.

29. Building on the London Conference of January 2010, at the Kabul Conference the Government presented a comprehensive road map to achieve its objectives, consisting of 23 national priority programmes to advance progress in security, social and economic development, governance and the rule of law, including reforms to improve public financial management and accountability, and reduce corruption. In support of these undertakings, international participants expressed their willingness to progressively align their development assistance behind the national priority programmes with the goal of achieving 80 per cent alignment over the next two years. The international community also reaffirmed its support for channelling at least 50 per cent of its assistance through the Government's core budget in the same time frame. In line with the Paris principles of aid effectiveness, donors agreed to work with the Government to improve Afghan procurement and international contracting procedures, and to further the effectiveness of assistance provided outside the Government budget.

30. The Government has made a promising start in taking forward the Kabul process. First, it has begun to detail the national priority programmes with a focus on identifying short-term (3-6 months) and medium-term (6-12 months) targets. Second, it is taking steps to strengthen public financial management and administration through joint capacity assessments of the 14 line ministries responsible for the bulk of development spending. Identified capacity and delivery gaps will be addressed through the provision of additional technical assistance through the Civilian Technical Assistance Programme, training and procurement capacity-building. Third, the Government has committed itself to maintaining and further enhancing inter-ministerial collaboration and Cabinet oversight of progress of the Kabul process. The cluster approach, which organizes ministries within thematic clusters according to the Government's security and development priorities, with one ministry leading each cluster, will remain the framework for implementation of the prioritized development agenda but will be refined to maximize its focus and inclusiveness. Fourth, the Government has placed a high priority on the implementation of practical mechanisms to strengthen aid coherence. The "Operational guide: criteria for effective off-budget development finance" is intended to ensure that all donor projects are aligned with Government priorities

through a consultative process and financing agreement. This will enable the Government to monitor and track those activities conducted outside the Government budget or trust funds and report on them in its regular donor financial review. The Government will engage partners in the months ahead to establish open and efficient arrangements for consultation and certification of such donor activities.

31. Recognizing the need for a mutually accountable and effective monitoring mechanism for the Kabul process, the Government and international partners agreed in the communiqué of the Conference to strengthen the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Minister of Finance and my Special Representative. A number of practical steps have been jointly identified by the Co-Chairs, in consultation with Board members, including the holding of Board meetings every four months to take stock of progress, identify gaps and address obstacles to implementation. Ensuring overall coherence across the security, governance and development agendas will be an important oversight function of the Board. Such meetings will require effective preparation, for which the active engagement of the three standing committees on security, socio-economic development and governance is essential. The Government and UNAMA have proposed to align the standing committees more closely to the clusters, including through cluster leads co-chairing relevant standing committees. The first meeting of the Board since the Kabul Conference is expected to be held in November, to be preceded by at least one standing committee meeting in each subject area.

IV. Aid coherence

32. UNAMA is committed to supporting the Government's initiatives for greater aid coherence and effectiveness, as well as aligning aid behind the Government's priorities. UNAMA will thus facilitate a coherent Afghan-led agenda in security, governance and development. The joint efforts under way with the Government to strengthen the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board are intended to provide the required robust framework. UNAMA continues its close cooperation with its partners to enhance the functioning of the clusters, the standing committees and other relevant coordination mechanisms, and to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of the decisions of the Board. UNAMA and my Special Representative continue to work closely with all international stakeholders, including the European Union Special Representative and the NATO senior civilian representative, to advance transition to greater Afghan leadership.

33. Justice reform is an important component of the governance agenda, and UNAMA continues to engage Afghan judicial institutions and donors on the preparation of a six-month justice action plan to strengthen judicial institutions, access to justice, linkages between formal and informal systems, and transitional justice. The Mission is also supporting the nomination and selection of members of the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee of the High Office of Oversight, newly established as part of the Government's anti-corruption strategy.

34. The commitments made by the international community in London and Kabul to channel aid through the core budget requires that interim steps be taken, including increased financing through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund and other common funding mechanisms, the implementation of operational guidelines for off-budget development financing, and openness in subcontracting and

procurement efforts. UNAMA continues to convene the weekly donor coordination meetings to encourage donors to take forward the "Operational guide: criteria for effective off-budget development finance".

35. The Kabul process is a national agenda which can be successful only if it delivers at the local level countrywide. As Co-Chair, with the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, of the Sub-National Governance Task Force, UNAMA is supporting the alignment of existing subnational policies and workplans with the six national priority programmes, including the Governors' performance fund, municipal governance and capacity-building. As a result, some donors have jointly funded these priority programmes. UNAMA field offices are supporting efforts to improve coordination among local and provincial officials in western Afghanistan through the organization of workshops in partnership with the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, funded by UNDP. Field offices are also assisting elected and appointed officials in the review and prioritization of provincial development plans, and facilitating partners in the field to channel their activities in support of identified needs. While the current emphasis on strengthening the capacity of line ministries is laudable, it is critical that efforts in Kabul are accompanied by capacity-building efforts at the provincial and district levels. UNAMA field offices are supporting Civil Service Commission-led provincial capacity-building working groups to ensure their ability to effectively oversee the many training programmes now being implemented at the provincial level. A workshop on quick-implementation projects conducted by UNAMA in Kapisa Province, for example, helped members of the provincial Working Group to understand the importance of developing a provincial capacity-building needs assessment and to build their confidence in meeting their responsibilities and fulfilling their roles.

36. The Kabul process can be successful only if it is inclusive of all segments of Afghan society. UNAMA continues to advocate for and support the participation of Afghan civil society, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the private sector in the implementation of the commitments made at the Kabul Conference. Engagement with Afghan non-governmental representatives on the development of cluster action plans and the participation of civil society in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board are practical ways in which stakeholders can support the Government in realizing its commitments to the Afghan people. To promote the inclusiveness of the Kabul process, UNAMA advocated and supported the attendance, as observers, of representatives of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and civil society at the Board meeting of 8 July, which prepared the Kabul Conference, and for the attendance of civil society representatives at the Conference itself. My Deputy Special Representative in addition met delegates of Afghan women's networks and facilitated a number of meetings between the Government and civil society organizations, as a result of which it was agreed that two civil society representatives would speak at the Conference, both of them women. Bilateral meetings of UNAMA and seven civil society networks subsequently explored how civil society could better participate in the design, implementation and monitoring of the national priority programmes following the Conference.

V. Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development

37. Ensuring access for humanitarian assistance remained a challenge during the reporting period, and ongoing conflict and insecurity continued to limit the presence and the activities of aid agencies across the country. Attacks against aid workers continued, representing a worrisome trend and impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

38. The Emergency Response Fund established in February 2010 and administered by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (see A/64/872-S/2010/318), has received to date pledges totalling US$ 4,572,250, of which $1,008,592 has been disbursed. Allocations of $2,863,638 were made in response to the Samangan earthquake of 20 April 2010 and other localized emergencies.

39. Heavy rains early in August 2010 led to flash floods that affected nine Afghan provinces. The Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority reported that approximately 200,000 people were affected. The Authority, supported by humanitarian agencies, has provided humanitarian assistance in all nine affected provinces. While most of the immediate needs of the population have been covered, the provision of emergency shelter materials remains essential.

40. The majority of recent conflict-induced displacement occurred in the southern Provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. Working with local counterparts, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes have continued to assist internally displaced persons in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province.

41. A total of 97,145 Afghan refugees have voluntarily returned with UNHCR assistance so far in 2010, including 91,583 from Pakistan since the resumption of repatriation on 22 March, and 5,515 from the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1 January to 15 August. The Government of Afghanistan and UNHCR anticipate that the repatriation figure for 2010 will be double that of 2009.

42. The World Food Programme continues to provide nutrition and food assistance to the most vulnerable. During the reporting period, WFP provided 877,980 children with high-energy biscuits and school meals; and 10,200 tuberculosis patients and more than 2,080 pregnant or lactating women and children under 5 received supplementary food. A total of 19,365 people, mostly women, underwent skills training.

43. Community-based management of acute malnutrition is ongoing in 11 provinces, and 6,531 children have participated in the programme since January 2010. Approximately 20 per cent of Afghan newborn children do not complete routine immunization in their first year. The Ministry of Public Health, together with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and WHO, conducted the first Child Health Week in 25 of the 38 districts with less than 50 per cent immunization coverage in July and August. UNICEF participated in three rounds of national and subnational polio immunization days in the north-eastern, eastern and south-eastern regions during the reporting period. These campaigns targeted 4,437,797 people despite the difficult security conditions. Polio transmission remains a serious cause of concern and is facilitated by the constant population movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

44. Five maternal health training centres were inaugurated in June in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Nangarhar, Kandahar and Herat. Maternity homes have been built in Kandahar, Badakhshan, Kunar, Laghman, Bamyan and Herat.

45. The Ministry of Education, in its new national education strategic plan, committed itself to achieving a literacy rate of 75 per cent by 2020. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is supporting this goal through nine-month literacy programmes. From May to July 2010, approximately 90,000 village youths and adults, 60 per cent of them women, in 47 districts completed the programme.

46. The Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and UNAMA jointly launched the 2009 survey, *Drug Use in Afghanistan*, on 21 June. The report estimates that nearly 940,000 Afghans between 15 and 64 are regular and/or problem drug users. Opium use has increased by 53 per cent and heroin use by 140 per cent since the last survey was conducted in 2005. The survey also reported that only 11 per cent of drug users had received any form of treatment or intervention, as the current capacity can treat only 10,500 people annually. Some 780,000 drug users await treatment. President Karzai marked the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on 26 June with a strong message of support for counter-narcotics efforts. The Ministry and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime verified 2,316 hectares of fields in 11 provinces — Badakhshan, Farah, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kapisa, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Takhar and Uruzgan — where poppy had been eradicated, but instability continued to hamper eradication campaigns in the south and south-west.

47. July saw the highest opium price rise over the past five years, because of speculation related to insecurity, military operations and the opium disease. This trend undoes the steady decline of prices over the most recent years and is expected to result in increased surface planting (higher acreage) and eventually the loss of one or more opium-free provinces in 2011. Mitigation measures will require enhanced national interventions and international assistance in pre-planting campaigns and the provision of alternative livelihoods.

48. Progress has been made towards clearing mine and explosive ordnance contamination of the Aynak Copper Mine, which is expected to produce a significant number of jobs and boost the Afghan economy. The first area designated for clearance is 80 per cent complete and will be handed over to the Ministry of Mines in a few months' time. A cross-border agreement between Afghanistan and Tajikistan will permit mine clearance in remote parts of Badakhshan and promote the development of impoverished rural communities.

VI. Human rights

49. The mid-year report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in Afghanistan, released by UNAMA on 10 August, highlighted the rising human cost of the ongoing conflict. UNAMA documented 3,268 conflict-related civilian casualties, including deaths and/or injuries of Afghan civilians, from 1 January to 30 June 2010, a 31 per cent increase compared to the first six months of 2009. Anti-government elements were responsible for 2,477 casualties, up 53 per cent from the same period in 2009. Casualties attributed to pro-government forces, at

386, decreased by 30 per cent during the same period, the result of a significant decline in deaths and injuries caused by air attacks.

50. Anti-government elements used a greater number of larger and more sophisticated improvised explosive devices throughout the country, those devices accounting for 29 per cent of the total number of civilian deaths in the first six months of 2010. Furthermore, the number of civilians assassinated or executed by anti-government elements surged by more than 95 per cent, including public executions of children. In the case of pro-government forces, air attacks remained the most harmful of their tactics, accounting for 31 per cent of the total civilian deaths attributed to them. However, civilian deaths caused by pro-government force air strikes decreased by 64 per cent from the same period in 2009, reflecting the implementation of the ISAF tactical directives restricting air strikes and other measures taken in an effort to reduce civilian casualties.

51. The findings of the report also demonstrate that Afghan children and women are increasingly bearing the brunt of the conflict. Women casualties increased by 6 per cent and child casualties leaped by 55 per cent from 2009. Improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks by anti-government elements caused the most casualties among women and children, including 74 children, which represents an increase of 155 per cent from the same period in 2009.

52. UNAMA and the United Nations Development Fund for Women actively supported the participation of civil society, women's groups and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission in the Kabul Conference. UNAMA assisted in coordinating a two-day gathering on 17 and 18 July, which brought together nearly 200 women from all over Afghanistan to identify priority issues for women at the Conference. Civil society and Human Rights Commission participants stressed during the Conference that women's rights and human rights should not be compromised in the ongoing peace and reconciliation process, and called for the enforcement of legislation supporting women's rights. The communiqué of the Conference called for the inclusion of Afghan civil society and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission in the implementation of the national priority programme for human rights and civic responsibilities. The Human Rights Commission has since met line ministries and civil society to develop a six-month plan of activities to implement the programme, which includes strengthening of the Human Rights Support Unit in the Ministry of Justice. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission on 21 August submitted a six-month plan of activities to the Ministry of Finance and the President's Office for approval.

53. UNAMA is monitoring the activities of the previously mentioned Detention Release Committee established by the Government of Afghanistan following the Peace Jirga held in June to review cases of suspected insurgents detained without evidence or charge. UNAMA has stressed the importance of basing decisions on release strictly on legal grounds, in accordance with Afghan law and procedure. The Committee's spokesperson in August informed UNAMA that 304 individuals had been released. UNAMA is concerned about reported irregularities in the release of detainees and lack of openness in the review process.

54. The first six months of 2010 saw more than 1,030 incidents of child rights violations documented by the country task force on children and armed conflict. Because access to insecure areas remained a significant obstacle to the verification of reports, UNAMA and UNICEF initiated training in August for Afghan and

international field monitors on child rights violations. A sixth regional task force to monitor and report on child rights violations was established in Mazar-e-Sharif in June.

55. On 18 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on Children and Armed Conflict. The Committee's terms of reference include support for monitoring and reporting of grave child rights violations, policy and legal reform, and the prevention of violations, such as sexual abuse. The Government indicated its intention to develop an action plan on the prevention of recruitment of children under 18, including the need for more stringent verification procedures, following the description of underage recruitment of Afghan National Police in my most recent report on the status of children and armed conflict (A/64/742-S/2010/181). UNAMA and UNICEF will provide technical advice and capacity-building to support the Government's initiative.

VII. Mission support/operational issues

56. UNAMA has identified a safe and secure location, where the Mission can establish a Support Office and Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Centre, from where the Mission can fully perform administrative functions, particularly in human resources, finance and procurement and provide continuous back-up of the Mission's data. Steps are being taken to open the UNAMA Support Office in Kuwait by the end of September 2010. I am grateful to the Government of Kuwait for its generous support in this regard. The move of approximately 39 international posts from Kabul allows for the deployment to Afghanistan of critically needed substantive UNAMA staff, currently in the final stages of recruitment.

57. UNAMA is upgrading existing compounds to meet the revised minimum operating residential security standards. New secure consolidated residential and working premises provided by the Government of Afghanistan in Jalalabad opened on 6 August 2010. Similar initiatives are being pursued for the regional offices in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Kunduz, with co-located accommodation and workspace available for all international staff and international armed guards. UNAMA and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) are undertaking a joint project to upgrade security for the UNAMA regional office in Herat, which is managed by UNOPS. UNAMA provincial offices are being upgraded on a priority basis, depending on the security environment and conditions of the current premises. Communications and connectivity upgrades are also under way.

58. The plans for additional secure accommodation and workspace for staff required to work in Kabul city centre include a new compound to be taken over from the Government of the Netherlands. The compound is expected to provide residential and office accommodation for more than 60 international staff and office accommodation for a similar number of national staff in November 2010. I am very grateful to the Netherlands for its assistance in this regard.

59. Because of the lack of secure accommodation in the mission area, the vacancy rate for UNAMA international staff remains at 39 per cent, as indicated in my last report. This is, however, projected to decrease as international staff members are deployed to Kuwait and with the progressive availability of new secure

accommodation for international staff in Kabul and throughout the Mission's regional and provincial presences.

VIII. Observations

60. The Kabul Conference demonstrated the commitment of the Government of Afghanistan to assume greater control of its own future. The substantive preparatory work undertaken by the Government was impressive given the breadth of issues addressed, the level of cooperation within and among ministries, and the depth of engagement with Afghan civil society and human rights representatives, as well as international bilateral and multilateral partners. The Government of Afghanistan, including the security forces, is to be congratulated on this historic achievement, which also required significant logistical and organizational preparations, which they carried out with great professionalism. I should also like to thank international partners for their practical and substantive assistance to the Government to ensure a successful outcome.

61. The Conference resulted in joint commitments with detailed benchmarks indicating a clear way forward: the Kabul process. The key commitments made by both the Government and the international community at the Conference included the development of a framework, timelines and benchmarks for the new national priority programmes, progress towards the Afghan lead in security, improvement of governance and tackling corruption. The timely implementation of these commitments will be essential to maintain the positive momentum of the Kabul process and I urge the international community to provide the necessary assistance to support the process, in greater alignment with Afghan priorities.

62. The Conference is merely the start of the Kabul process. The challenging task of detailing and implementing agreed commitments remains. In order to succeed, our activities must be focused on priority areas and appropriately sequenced and coordinated. While the national priority programmes focus on long-term growth, we will need to ensure that these efforts are also accompanied by immediate delivery to the Afghan people. There must be a peace dividend for Afghans to have confidence in future progress. The international community must support delivery of assistance at the national and subnational levels simultaneously as we look to building the framework and capacities for long-term sustainable development and governance. Maintaining focus and momentum on the transition to Afghan leadership in the face of rising security challenges, upcoming elections, and competing domestic, regional and international political pressures will require sustained Government attention, as well as the coherent support of its international partners.

63. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board will be the main body to monitor the implementation the commitments made at both the London and Kabul Conferences, and will be the guardian of their implementation. My Special Representative, as co-chair of the Board, is consulting with the international community on how to strengthen this mechanism and its subsidiary coordination bodies, including the Government's clusters and the Board's standing committees.

64. The United Nations is committed to contributing to enhanced aid effectiveness by increasing the system's coherence and ability to deliver as one. My Special Representative is leading a United Nations country team effort to put in place an integrated strategic framework by December 2010 that will define priority areas for

United Nations engagement in support of Afghanistan's transition and practical measures to enhance collective impact in the field, in close cooperation with Afghan national and provincial authorities.

65. Much of the progress achieved is fragile and continues to be overshadowed by the deterioration in the security situation. The Government's efforts to implement the peace and reintegration programme are particularly important in this regard. The Government has established a number of initiatives centred on building confidence, which have been described in this report. The challenges for those leading the process will be to ensure sustainable momentum while maintaining the national consensus achieved at the Peace Jirga.

66. Meanwhile, the holding of credible national assembly elections on 18 September will be crucial to Afghanistan's democratic progress and to the strengthening of accountability between the Government and its people. While technical preparations for the elections remain on track, there are many challenges to be faced in the coming months. First, security threats could depress voter turnout in many areas. Second, while significant efforts have been made to learn from the lessons of 2009 to eliminate systemic fraud, it is impossible to totally eliminate the possibility of fraud. Third, the large number of candidates contesting the elections is likely to generate a large number of complaints, whether there are grounds for complaints or not. The effective functioning of the Electoral Complaints Commission in this regard, including at the provincial level, is critical. Finally, the need to prevent the opportunity for fraud has led the Independent Electoral Commission to close polling centres in the more volatile areas, causing some groups to complain of disenfranchisement. The Independent Electoral Commission has endeavoured, however, to add polling stations to polling centres in nearby areas as a means of addressing these concerns. I urge the Government of Afghanistan and its security forces to continue their efforts to safeguard both the electorate and the electoral process to ensure inclusive, transparent and credible elections. I also appeal to candidates to conduct campaigns in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the Independent Electoral Commission. I commend the Commission for the decisions it has taken so far to enhance the credibility of the elections, often under significant pressure, as well as the international community for its support to the Commission.

67. Pursuit of long-term electoral reform, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1917 (2010) and the agreements reached at the London Conference and the Kabul Conference, remains an important priority. Discussions on the reform process need to begin soon. Working on the electoral reform agenda with the Government, electoral institutions, and all relevant Afghan and international partners will be a critical component of UNAMA activities after the elections of 18 September. The electoral legal framework and sustainability of the electoral calendar, the currently temporary nature of the Electoral Complaints Commission, a single nationwide civil and/or voter registry, district boundary demarcations for district council, municipal and village elections, support to national observation groups and political groups, and the institution- and capacity-building of the Independent Electoral Commission are among the issues to be discussed in the context of longer-term electoral reform.

68. I am encouraged to note the continuing dialogue between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries on regional cooperation in several areas. The regional

conference held ahead of the Kabul Conference and the establishment of the Core Group both fulfil a London Conference commitment and address coordination gaps in ongoing regional cooperation efforts. I encourage the Government to continue to strengthen its coordination with its regional partners. UNAMA will support this initiative through the good offices of my Special Representative.

69. I remain concerned by the increasing number of civilian casualties. In particular, Afghan children and women are increasingly being killed and injured in their homes and communities. The human impact of the conflict highlights the fact that measures to protect Afghan civilians effectively and to minimize the impact of the conflict on basic human rights are more urgent than ever. All concerned must do more to protect civilians and comply with their legal obligations under international law.

70. Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to thank my Special Representative, Staffan de Mistura, for his commitment and dedication, and to express my gratitude to the staff serving with UNAMA and the United Nations family for their hard work in support of Afghanistan.